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BEYOND COMPARE? A CODEFENDANT’S PRISON SENTENCE 
AS A MITIGATING FACTOR IN DEATH PENALTY CASES
Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier*
Abstract
This Article addresses whether the U.S. Constitution requires courts 
to permit capital defendants to submit, during sentencing, the mitigating 
factor that a codefendant for the same murder was sentenced to prison 
instead of to death.
The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly stressed the importance of 
mitigating factors in capital cases. For the most part, litigation since the 
reintroduction of capital punishment in the 1970s has clarified what 
circumstances are to be weighed as mitigating. But the Court has not 
addressed the current divide among lower courts regarding whether the 
Eighth Amendment requires courts to allow juries to consider a 
codefendant’s sentence as mitigating evidence.
This Article begins with the Supreme Court decisions regarding 
mitigating factors and proportionality, noting how the Court has stressed 
the importance of fairness in death penalty cases. This Article 
additionally examines how courts are currently split on the issue of 
whether a codefendant’s prison sentence should be weighed as a 
mitigating factor. Several state courts have treated this factor as 
mitigating while others have not. Although some U.S. courts of appeals 
have upheld lower court decisions rejecting this mitigating factor, most 
of those appellate court decisions were applying a deferential habeas 
corpus standard of review to uphold the lower court decision. Thus, the
issue itself remains unresolved. This Article concludes by explaining why 
logic and Supreme Court precedent dictate that courts should allow 
capital defendants to present this mitigating factor to juries. Jurors should 
be able to weigh the evidence and use it to make a decision when they are 
choosing between a sentence of death and a sentence of life in prison.
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INTRODUCTION
Courts have long struggled with the question of how to give out the 
death penalty in a fair and non-arbitrary manner. And if there is more than 
one capital defendant in the same case, issues of disparity are put into 
even sharper focus. When equally culpable codefendants are given 
radically different sentences for the same murder—or a more culpable 
defendant is given a prison sentence while a less culpable codefendant is 
given a death sentence—such results damage the public’s faith in the 
criminal justice system.1
                                                                                                                     
1. For purposes of this Article, the term “codefendant” is used to include accomplices and 
anyone involved in the same capital crime as the defendant, whether or not their cases are tried 
together, tried separately, or the codefendant agrees to a plea bargain.
2
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For example, Great Britain executed nineteen-year-old Derek Bentley
in 1953 while sparing his accomplice, who had done the killing.2 Bentley 
had shouted, “Let him have it!” to his robbery accomplice, who then shot 
and killed a police officer.3 During the trial, lawyers debated whether 
Bentley’s exclamation meant that his accomplice should give the gun to 
the officer or whether Bentley was encouraging his accomplice to shoot.4
Bentley was convicted and executed; the young accomplice who shot the 
officer received a prison sentence.5 Questions about the fairness of the 
outcome, where the shooter avoided the death penalty while the 
accomplice was executed, are one of the reasons that Great Britain later 
abolished the death penalty.6
In one of the most famous U.S. Supreme Court death penalty cases, 
the Supreme Court twice upheld the death sentence of Warren 
McCleskey, who was ultimately executed in 1991.7 Although the 
Supreme Court did not consider issues relating to the codefendants in 
McCleskey’s case, some of the arguments in the lower courts centered on 
questions about his accomplices’ role in a robbery that resulted in a police 
officer being killed.8 Because no witnesses saw which one of the robbers 
shot the police officer, the claim of one of McCleskey’s codefendants—
that McCleskey later admitted to the killing—constituted a key piece of 
evidence against McCleskey.9 The other participants in the crime
received varying sentences, and all three were eventually released from 
prison, while the state executed McCleskey in the electric chair.10 But up 
until his execution, McCleskey claimed that he did not kill the police 
officer during the robbery.11
                                                                                                                     
2. JAMES B. CHRISTOPH, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND BRITISH POLITICS 98–100 (1962).
3. Vivian Rakoff, The Death Penalty and Youth, 35 FAM. PRAC. NEWS, May 15, 2005, at 10.
4. Id. Fifteen minutes before the police officer was killed by Bentley’s robbery 
accomplice, Bentley was taken into custody. See CHRISTOPH, supra note 2, at 98. 
5. It is still debated today whether Bentley meant for his accomplice to shoot or to give up 
the gun. Rakoff, supra note 3.
6. See Donald S. Connery, You, Me and the Death Penalty, HARTFORD COURANT (Jan. 9, 
2005), https://www.courant.com/news/connecticut/hc-xpm-2005-01-09-0501090490-story.html
[https://perma.cc/WP4C-BZV4]. In 1991, Bentley’s story was made into a movie called LET HIM 
HAVE IT (British Screen Productions 1991), and in 1993, Bentley received a royal posthumous 
pardon; after a rehearing on appeal in 2001, his conviction was quashed. Frederick C. Millett,
Note, Will the United States Follow England (and the Rest of the World) in Abandoning Capital 
Punishment?, 6 PIERCE L. REV. 547, 572 (2007).
7. See JEFFREY L. KIRCHMEIER, IMPRISONED BY THE PAST: WARREN MCCLESKEY AND THE 
AMERICAN DEATH PENALTY 179, 190–92 (2015).
8. Id. at 15–16.
9. Id. at 18–19.
10. See id. at 305–06.
11. Mark Curriden, ‘I Deeply Regret a Life Was Taken,’ ATLANTA J.-CONST., Sept. 21,
1991, at A12. When his execution date approached, a reporter asked McCleskey what sentence 
3
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Another execution that took place amidst questions about a 
codefendant occurred when Texas executed Shareef Ahmad Abdul-
Rahim on December 7, 1982, in the first use of lethal injection in the 
United States.12 Abdul-Rahim had been convicted, with Woody Loudres,
of the crimes of kidnapping and murder. Jurors initially found both 
Abdul-Rahim and Lourdes guilty of killing a man during an attempted 
car theft while both defendants were intoxicated and high on heroin.13
Neither Abdul-Rahim nor Loudres said who fired the lethal shot.14 After 
both defendants were initially sentenced to death, Loudres was granted a
new trial and accepted a plea bargain under which he could be released 
in six-and-a-half years.15 The prosecutor from Abdul-Rahim’s trial 
supported the condemned man’s appeal, asserting that it was unfair to 
execute him while Loudres would not be executed.16 And on appeal, 
Abdul-Rahim argued that his sentence was disproportional to Loudres’s 
sentence.17 But the court rejected this argument.18 Abdul-Rahim, 
convicted under his birth name, Charles Brooks Jr., became the first black 
man executed in the United States since 1967.19
In a more recent example of disparity in sentencing codefendants, in 
Ohio, Timothy Mosley accepted a plea deal for a sentence of life without 
parole in exchange for his testimony against Austin Myers, who was 
sentenced to death.20 Mosley had stabbed the victim to death while 
nineteen-year-old Myers held the victim.21 Myers’s attorney argued that 
Myers’s death sentence was unfair in comparison to Mosley’s life 
                                                                                                                     
he should have received. Id. He replied, “The appropriate punishment should be what the other 
codefendants got—life in prison.” Id.
12. Rob Warden & Daniel Lennard, Death in America Under Color of Law: Our Long, 
Inglorious Experience with Capital Punishment, 13 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 194, 246 (2018).
13. See FREDERICK DRIMMER, UNTIL YOU ARE DEAD: THE BOOK OF EXECUTIONS IN 
AMERICA 71 (1990); Dick Reavis, Charlie Brooks’ Last Words, TEX. MONTHLY (Feb. 1983), 
https://www.texasmonthly.com/articles/charlie-brooks-last-words/ [https://perma.cc/DDN5-
6NTN]. Woodie (aka “Woody”) Loudres served eleven years in prison and was released on parole 
in 1989. Jon Roberts, A Matter of Principle: Why Conservatives Should Oppose the Death 
Penalty, TEX. OBSERVER (Feb. 17, 2010, 5:27 P.M.), https://www.texasobserver.org/a-matter-of-
principle-why-conservatives-should-oppose-the-death-penalty/ [https://perma.cc/KDU9-P6Y3].
14. DRIMMER, supra note 13.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 72.
17. Warden & Lennard, supra note 12, at 247.
18. Id.
19. DRIMMER, supra note 13, at 72.
20. See Lawrence Budd, Ohio Supreme Court Questions Lawyer Arguing for Clayton 
Man’s Life, DAYTON DAILY NEWS (Dec. 5, 2017), https://www.mydaytondailynews.com/news/
crime--law/ohio-supreme-court-questions-lawyer-arguing-for-clayton-man-life/yYmSqh2armi
PLmMHtHGn3J/ [https://perma.cc/CFS2-Z74H].
21. State v. Myers, 114 N.E.3d 1138, 1154 (Ohio), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 822 (2019) 
(mem.).
4
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sentence.22 But in 2018, the Ohio Supreme Court upheld Myers’s death 
sentence, concluding that Ohio’s statute mandating proportionality 
review only required such review to compare Mosley’s case to “similar 
cases,” and that a codefendant who did not receive a death sentence at 
trial did not fall into the category of “similar cases” for comparison.23
Not all disparate sentences end with executions. In 1977, Georgia 
became the first state to exercise clemency powers in the modern death 
penalty era. The Georgia Pardons Board, under Governor George Busbee,
granted clemency to Charles H. Hill because his sentence was 
disproportionate to his codefendant’s.24 Hill had been sentenced to death 
in 1975 even though the actual killer in the case had received a life 
sentence.25 Eventually, Hill was paroled in 2008.26
Of course, murder accomplices may have different levels of 
culpability in crimes, and they may have different mitigating 
circumstances, so fairness does not dictate that they should always 
receive the exact same sentence. But courts in recent years have struggled 
with the issue of whether, in death penalty cases, a jury should be allowed 
to consider the sentence of another defendant who participated in the 
same murder. Although early Supreme Court cases discussed a 
proportionality component of the Eighth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution, the main area of debate regarding codefendants is whether 
the Constitution requires that juries be permitted to weigh a codefendant’s 
sentence as a mitigating factor at sentencing.
This Article explores whether a defendant has a constitutional right to 
use evidence of a codefendant’s non-death sentence as mitigating 
evidence in a capital sentencing hearing. Courts are divided on the issue.
In Part I, this Article begins by exploring the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence that provides a foundation for the debate. This discussion 
considers the Court’s modern death penalty structure and how the Court 
has evaluated arguments that the Eighth Amendment includes a 
requirement that a defendant’s death sentence be proportionate to 
punishments for similar crimes. Part II addresses the Court’s landmark 
cases on mitigating factors, including how the Court defines “mitigation” 
and when defendants have a constitutional right to submit evidence as 
mitigating. Part III provides an overview of state and federal court cases 
                                                                                                                     
22. Budd, supra note 20.
23. Myers, 114 N.E.3d at 1185. Additionally, the Ohio Supreme Court noted Mosley’s role 
in instigating and planning the murder. Id.
24. See Clemency, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/clemency
[https:// perma.cc/AE6X-F8EZ] (last updated July 20, 2018); Alan Judd, Death Row Mystery: 
Why Some Inmates Get Mercy, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Oct. 1, 2015), https://www.ajc.com/blog/ 
investigations/death-row-mystery-why-some-inmates-get-mercy/IO5PdLyyKbjZ0oetKpE53L/
[https://perma.cc/L4C9-QW9D].
25. Judd, supra note 24.
26. Id.
5
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that have addressed the codefendant issue and the reasons they have 
reached different results. Then, Part IV evaluates whether, based upon 
the Court’s prior cases, the Eighth Amendment requires trial courts to 
permit capital defendants to use a codefendant’s sentence as mitigating 
evidence. Part IV also considers how lower courts have treated the issue, 
concluding that in light of the Court’s concerns about fairness and the 
role of mitigating factors, courts should allow juries to weigh such 
evidence. 
I. THE SUPREME COURT’S DEATH PENALTY JURISPRUDENCE ON 
FAIRNESS AND PROPORTIONALITY
After the U.S. Supreme Court held in 1972 that existing death penalty 
laws that gave complete discretion to sentencing jurors in capital cases 
violated the Eighth Amendment, the Court evaluated new death penalty 
statutes in 1976.27 These statutes and the Court’s subsequent decisions 
created the modern death penalty approach. From the inception of the 
modern death penalty, the Supreme Court was concerned with creating a 
fair death penalty that is not imposed arbitrarily and treats similar 
defendants in similar ways. The Justices wished to prevent the arbitrary 
application of the death penalty and ensure fairness by allowing juries to 
consider individual characteristics of defendants and their crimes. But the 
question regarding how best to limit arbitrariness while also achieving 
fairness remained, even as some judges and scholars concluded such a 
task was impossible.28 Such a struggle goes back to the early days of the 
country’s criminal justice system.
During the early years of the United States, all states followed the 
English common law practice of using an automatic death penalty, 
whereby courts would impose the death penalty automatically for people 
found guilty of certain offenses.29 Subsequently, states began to limit the 
number of crimes that made a defendant eligible for the death penalty.30
                                                                                                                     
27. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 196–206 (1976) (plurality opinion).
28. See, e.g., John D. Bessler, Tinkering Around the Edges: The Supreme Court’s Death 
Penalty Jurisprudence, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1913, 1941 (2012); Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, 
Aggravating and Mitigating Factors: The Paradox of Today’s Arbitrary and Mandatory Capital 
Punishment Scheme, 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 345, 346 (1998); James S. Liebman, Slow 
Dancing with Death: The Supreme Court and Capital Punishment, 1963-2006, 107 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 31 (2007).
29. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 289, 301 (1976) (citing H. BEDAU, THE 
DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 5–6, 15, 27–28 (rev. ed. 1967)) (holding that a mandatory death 
penalty system violates the Constitution). In the thirteenth century, English common law made all 
criminal homicides “prima facie capital, but all were subject to the benefit of clergy, which after 
1350 came to be available to almost any man who could read.” McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 
183, 197 (1971) (emphasis omitted).
30. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 289–90.
6
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Generally, though, jurisdictions automatically imposed the death penalty 
for first-degree murders.31 These mandatory death penalty systems did 
not allow for consideration of defendants’ individual characteristics.32
Eventually, though, many jurisdictions became concerned about 
problems with such a mandatory death penalty system. For example, if 
jurors found a defendant guilty but did not believe the defendant should 
be executed, the jury might vote to acquit the defendant as the only way 
to save the accused’s life.33 So, around the mid-1800s, states began 
moving toward having discretionary death penalties.34 The justification 
for the change was that it would limit jury nullification and create a fairer 
death penalty system that allowed jurors to consider mercy based on 
individual characteristics of capital defendants and their crimes.35 But 
historians note that southern states were also motivated to give jurors 
discretion because all-white juries would be more lenient toward white
defendants and harsher toward African-American defendants.36
Still, by the 1960s, the federal government, and every state that used 
juries (as opposed to judges) for capital sentencing, allowed the jurors to 
use their discretion in deciding whether to impose capital punishment.37
However, this shift to allow jurors to use their discretion created another 
problem. Because the laws gave so much discretion to jurors, defense 
attorneys raised challenges asserting that this discretion made the use of 
the death penalty more arbitrary.38 The issue eventually made it to the 
Supreme Court.
In 1972, in Furman v. Georgia,39 a majority of the Supreme Court
Justices in a per curiam opinion held that the death sentences in the three 
cases at issue violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.40 With 
each of the nine Justices writing separate opinions, several of the Justices 
in the majority focused on the arbitrary use of the punishment.41 For 
example, Justice Douglas stressed that the capital punishment laws before 
the Court were “pregnant with discrimination” against minorities and the 
                                                                                                                     
31. See id. at 289; McGautha, 402 U.S. at 198.
32. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304.
33. See, e.g., KIRCHMEIER, supra note 7, at 58.
34. Id.
35. See id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. See WILLIAM J. BOWERS ET AL., LEGAL HOMICIDE: DEATH AS PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA,
1864–1982, at 174 (1984).
39. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
40. Id. at 239–40.
41. Id. at 240; cf. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 196 (1971) (holding that the 
Fourteenth Amendment is not violated when a capital sentencing jury is not given guiding 
factors), vacated sub nom. Crampton v. Ohio, 408 U.S. 941 (1972).
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underprivileged.42 Justice Stewart analogized the process of selecting the 
condemned to the randomness of a lightning strike.43 Although the 
Justices in the majority did not agree on a specific reasoning, the Court 
concluded that the death penalty statutes were unconstitutional,44
effectively putting a halt to all executions in the United States.45
In response to Furman, states began writing new death penalty laws 
that legislators hoped would avoid the constitutional problems implicated 
by statutes that gave jurors complete discretion.46 These new statutes 
generally took one of two approaches. Some made the death penalty 
mandatory for defendants convicted of specific capital crimes.47 Others
were designed to leave some discretion to the capital sentencing jurors 
while giving them questions or factors to provide guidance.48 Most of 
these “guided discretion” statutes permitted jurors or sentencing judges 
to weigh specific aggravating factors, which support a death sentence,
against mitigating factors.49
Then, in 1976, the Court addressed cases from states that had enacted 
these new death penalty laws. In one group of cases, a majority of the 
Court found the mandatory death penalty statutes unconstitutional.50 In 
other cases, a majority of the Justices upheld the guided discretion 
statutes.51
In Gregg v. Georgia,52 one of the guided discretion statute cases, the 
Court examined Georgia’s law featuring a bifurcated system that 
contained specific aggravating and mitigating factors for a jury to 
consider.53 The Plurality concluded that Georgia’s law provided jurors 
                                                                                                                     
42. Furman, 408 U.S. at 257 (Douglas, J., concurring).
43. Id. at 309–10 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Stewart concluded that the Eighth 
Amendment does not permit capital punishment “to be so wantonly and so freakishly imposed.” 
Id. at 310.
44. See id. at 239–40.
45. See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE 
AMERICAN AGENDA 37 (1986) (“The Justices entered similar orders in 120 other death penalty 
appeals pending before the Court and effectively prevented the execution of all prisoners on death 
row at the time.”).
46. BOWERS ET AL., supra note 38.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. See id.
50. See, e.g., Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 336 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 
428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976).
51. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206–07 (1976) (plurality opinion); Jurek v. 
Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 276 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 259 (1976). The Court also 
held that the death penalty per se does not violate the Eighth Amendment. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 169.
52. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
53. Id. at 164–65 (plurality opinion).
8
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with adequate guidance through “clear and objective standards.”54 On the 
same day, in Jurek v. Texas55 and Proffitt v. Florida,56 the Court upheld 
other guided sentencing statutes.57
Subsequent cases clarified and continue to clarify the roles of 
aggravating and mitigating factors in capital cases. More recently, in 
2016, the Supreme Court in Kansas v. Carr58 held that the Constitution 
does not require judges to inform juries about the burden of proof for 
mitigating circumstances.59 Justice Scalia reasoned that whether a fact is 
mitigating is not a factual finding but “largely a judgment call (or perhaps 
a value call)” where weighing aggravating and mitigating circumstances 
involves “mostly a question of mercy.”60 Yet, even as the Court continues 
to fine-tune capital punishment doctrine, the 1976 cases laid out the basic 
constitutional requirements for capital sentencing that provide the main 
procedures used in U.S. courts today.
At the heart of the Court’s Eighth Amendment analysis in Furman and 
the landmark 1976 cases lies the concept that the death penalty should be 
applied fairly. Underlying the procedural requirements surrounding the 
use of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the Court has often 
stressed that capital punishment should be proportional to the crime and 
the individual. 
For example, the Supreme Court held in Enmund v. Florida61 in 1982
and in Tison v. Arizona62 in 1987, that in some situations the death penalty 
is not a proportional punishment for felony murderers.63 In Enmund, the 
defendant served as a getaway driver during a robbery-murder, and the 
trial judge, following a jury’s recommendation, sentenced the defendant 
to death.64 The Supreme Court held that the death sentence violated the 
Eighth Amendment because the State did not prove that the felony-
murder defendant killed, attempted to kill, or “intended or contemplated 
that life would be taken.”65
                                                                                                                     
54. Id. at 197–98 (quoting Coley v. State, 204 S.E.2d 612, 615 (Ga. 1974)).
55. 428 U.S. 262 (1976). Texas’s scheme was somewhat unique in that the statute provided 
three questions for jurors to answer when they were determining whether to sentence a capital 
defendant to death. See id. at 269 (plurality opinion).
56. 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
57. Jurek, 428 U.S. at 276 (plurality opinion); Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 259 (plurality opinion).
58. 136 S. Ct. 633 (2016).
59. Id. at 642–43.
60. Id. at 642. In the majority opinion, Justice Scalia noted, “[i]n the last analysis, jurors 
will accord mercy if they deem it appropriate, and withhold mercy if they do not, which is what
our case law is designed to achieve.” Id.
61. 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
62. 481 U.S. 137 (1987).
63. See id. at 158; Enmund, 458 U.S. at 801.
64. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 784–85.
65. Id. at 801.
9
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In its Eighth Amendment analysis, the Enmund Court considered 
whether society accepts the use of the death penalty for defendants who 
did not kill. It did so by weighing decisions by legislatures, juries, and 
prosecutors.66 Additionally, the Court evaluated whether the execution of 
such defendants serves the punishment goals of deterrence and 
retribution.67 Ultimately, the Court stressed that the punishment must be 
proportionate to the defendant’s crime and required courts to do 
additional analysis before imposing a death sentence on defendants who 
did not actually kill.68 The Court concluded that the felony-murder 
defendant’s “criminal culpability must be limited to his participation in 
the robbery, and his punishment must be tailored to his personal 
responsibility and moral guilt.”69
In another Eighth Amendment felony-murder case about culpability, 
the Court in Tison v. Arizona expanded upon Enmund’s proportionality 
requirement. The Court addressed the death sentences of two brothers 
who had helped their father and another inmate escape from prison.70
While the group was on the run, they abducted a family.71 After getting 
water to leave with the abducted family in the desert, the brothers 
watched their father and the other escapee kill the family.72
As in Enmund, the Tison Court considered state capital punishment 
statutes to assess “the state legislatures’ judgment as to proportionality in 
these circumstances” where a felony-murder defendant did not actually 
kill anyone.73 The Court also again considered the importance of 
individual mental culpability in assessing the appropriateness of the death 
penalty.74 Ultimately, the Court found “that major participation in the 
felony committed, combined with reckless indifference to human life, is 
sufficient to satisfy the Enmund culpability requirement.”75
Similarly, the Court has held that the death penalty is not a 
proportionate punishment for crimes like rape where the victim is not 
                                                                                                                     
66. Id. at 789–96.
67. Id. at 798.
68. Id. at 801.
69. Id.
70. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 138–39 (1987).
71. Id. at 140.
72. Id. at 141.
73. Id. at 152. The Tison Court evaluated the number of states that allowed the death penalty 
for felony-murder cases. Id. at 152–54. It concluded that “substantial and recent legislative 
authorization of the death penalty for the crime of felony murder regardless of the absence of a 
finding of an intent to kill powerfully suggests that our society does not reject the death penalty 
as grossly excessive under these circumstances.” Id. at 154.
74. Id. at 156–57.
75. Id. at 158.
10
Florida Law Review, Vol. 71, Iss. 4 [], Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol71/iss4/3
2019] BEYOND COMPARE 1027
killed. In Coker v. Georgia,76 a plurality held in 1977 that the use of the 
death penalty for the rape of an adult woman “is grossly disproportionate 
and excessive punishment for the crime of rape and is therefore forbidden 
by the Eighth Amendment as cruel and unusual punishment.”77 Three 
decades later in Kennedy v. Louisiana,78 the Court reinforced that 
conclusion by holding that the Eighth Amendment does not permit the 
use of the death penalty for the crime of raping a child where the crime 
did not result, and was not intended to result, in the death of the child.79
In these proportionality cases, the Court stressed that the punishment 
of the death penalty must be proportional in relation to the crime
generally.80 But the Court did not state that the Constitution requires strict 
proportionality between the punishment of death and an individual’s 
crime. Thus, one proportionality issue left open by the 1976 death penalty 
cases was whether the Eighth Amendment required appellate courts to 
compare an individual capital defendant’s case to other capital and 
noncapital cases to determine whether the death penalty was proportional
to that individual and the individual’s crime.81
States, interpreting Supreme Court precedent, struggled with this 
issue. Since Furman had stressed that it was important that the death 
penalty be applied fairly, some states included proportionality review in 
their new death penalty statutes. In Gregg, the three-Justice plurality and 
the three-Justice concurring opinion both emphasized that Georgia’s 
system had a statutorily required comparative proportionality review.82
Similarly, the Justices in Proffitt noted that in Florida, case law required 
reviewing courts to do a comparative proportionality review to ensure a 
defendant’s sentence was consistent with sentences in similar cases.83
Despite the emphasis on state-required proportionality review in those
1976 cases, the Court has not held that individual proportionality review 
                                                                                                                     
76. 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
77. Id. at 592.
78. 554 U.S. 407 (2008).
79. See id. at 421. The Court stressed “that capital punishment must ‘be limited to those 
offenders who commit “a narrow category of the most serious crimes” and whose extreme 
culpability makes them “the most deserving of execution.”’” Id. at 420 (quoting Roper v. 
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005)).
80. See, e.g., id. at 445–46.
81. Although the process may vary by jurisdiction, in jurisdictions that perform a 
proportionality review, a court must define the group of cases that are part of the review, then it 
must select the cases similar to the case being appealed, and finally, it must determine whether 
the case being appealed is proportional when compared to the pool of similar cases. See Timothy 
V. Kaufman-Osborn, Capital Punishment, Proportionality Review, and Claims of Fairness (with 
Lessons from Washington State), 79 WASH. L. REV. 775, 794 (2004).
82. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 198, 204–06 (1976) (plurality opinion); id. at 222–23 
(White, J., concurring).
83. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 250–51 (1976).
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is required for a constitutional death penalty system.84 Additionally, in 
Jurek, the Court upheld Texas’s sentencing scheme, which did not 
contain a comparative proportionality review.85
Eventually, the Court addressed the issue more directly. In 1984, in 
Pulley v. Harris,86 the Supreme Court evaluated whether the Eighth 
Amendment requires states to include a proportionality review in their 
death penalty review process.87 In examining the 1976 cases, the Court 
recalled that it had approved Texas’s death penalty even though the state
did not have comparative proportionality review.88 The Court also noted 
that in Zant v. Stephens89 the Court had considered proportionality review 
“to be an additional safeguard against arbitrarily imposed death 
sentences, but we certainly did not hold that comparative review was 
constitutionally required.”90
Thus, the Court in Harris concluded that comparative proportionality 
review by an appellate court is not required in every death penalty case.91
The Court did leave open the possibility that the Eighth Amendment 
might require a state appellate court to conduct a proportionality review 
if the state’s death penalty system is not otherwise constitutionally 
sufficient.92 But addressing the California death penalty, the Court held 
that the Constitution does not additionally require appellate 
proportionality review under that state’s existing capital punishment 
system.93
Although California’s system did not have such review, Justice 
Brennan pointed out in his dissenting opinion that more than thirty states 
required some form of comparative proportionality review, either by 
                                                                                                                     
84. See Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 44–48 (1984).
85. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 268–69 (1976); see also Harris, 465 U.S. at 48.
86. 465 U.S. 37 (1984).
87. Id. at 43–44.
88. Id. at 48.
89. 462 U.S. 862 (1983).
90. Harris, 465 U.S. at 50.
91. Id. at 50–51 (“There is thus no basis in our cases for holding that comparative 
proportionality review by an appellate court is required in every case in which the death penalty 
is imposed and the defendant requests it.”).
92. Id. at 51 (“Assuming that there could be a capital sentencing system so lacking in other 
checks on arbitrariness that it would not pass constitutional muster without comparative 
proportionality review, the 1977 California statute is not of that sort.”).
93. The Court noted that the California statute did not describe the nature of the appeal for 
a death penalty case, but the statute contained other procedures at sentencing that protected the 
rights of capital defendants. Id. at 53. These procedures included the requirement that at trial 
special circumstances must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, that at the sentencing stage the 
trier of fact considers aggravating and mitigating circumstances, that upon motion the trial judge 
will review a jury’s sentence of death, and that if the death sentence is upheld there is an automatic 
appeal. Id. at 51–53.
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judicial decision or by statute.94 In looking at the cases reversed on 
proportionality grounds in those states, Justice Brennan responded to the 
majority that such review helps “to eliminate some, if only a small part, 
of the irrationality that currently infects imposition of the death penalty 
by the various States.”95
Although Harris only directly addressed the death penalty procedures 
in California, the decision had a broader impact. State courts that had 
been performing proportionality review in capital cases soon began 
abandoning or watering down the practice.96
Yet, some jurisdictions still do require a form of comparative 
proportionality review. As such, sometimes the issue arises as to whether 
a codefendant’s sentence should be evaluated as some sort of 
proportionality review instead of the issue of whether it should be 
weighed as a mitigating factor. This Article mainly focuses on the 
mitigating factor aspect, but it is worth noting that a codefendant’s 
sentence may have constitutional significance for a court’s 
proportionality analysis too.97
After Harris, states still were free to implement the extra protections 
of comparative proportionality review even if the Eighth Amendment did 
not require such review.98 For example, by statute, states such as 
Tennessee require proportionality review as part of a direct appeal of a 
death sentence.99 And, in jurisdictions like Idaho that mandate 
                                                                                                                     
94. Id. at 71 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
95. Id. at 73.
96. See Leigh B. Bienen, The Proportionality Review of Capital Cases by State High Courts 
After Gregg: Only “the Appearance of Justice”?, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 130, 150–51
(1996); see also Bidish Sarma, Furman’s Resurrection: Proportionality Review and the Supreme 
Court’s Second Chance to Fulfill Furman’s Promise, 2009 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 238,
242, http://cardozolawreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/SARMA_2009_238.pdf [https://
perma.cc/F97B-RHMB] (indicating that state courts are moving “away from robust 
proportionality review”).
97. Another argument for why a jury or a court should evaluate a codefendant’s sentence is 
that the Eighth Amendment, common law, or both prohibit inconsistent jury verdicts. See, e.g.,
Getsy v. Mitchell, 456 F.3d 575, 591–92 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding that the death sentence for a
person who had been hired to commit the murder violated the Eighth Amendment when the person 
who hired him was sentenced to prison), vacated, No. 03-3200, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 32577 
(6th Cir. Nov. 22, 2006). For more on the rule of consistency, see United States v. Powell, 469 
U.S. 57, 66 (1984); Hartzel v. United States, 322 U.S. 680, 682 n.3 (1944); Morrison v. California, 
291 U.S. 82, 87–90 (1934).
98. See State v. Lafferty, 20 P.3d 342, 376 (Utah 2001) (“[C]ase-by-case proportionality 
review is not required under the United States or Utah Constitution.”), denial of post-conviction 
relief aff’d, 175 P.3d 530 (Utah 2007).
99. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-206(c)(1)(D) (2018) (stating that the appellate court is 
to consider whether each death sentence “is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed 
in similar cases, considering both the nature of the crime and the defendant”). Washington and 
Delaware have a similar proportionality provision in their state statutes, although the death 
13
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proportionality review by statute, courts have considered codefendants’ 
sentences in determining whether a death sentence is disproportionate or 
unjust.100 The Montana Supreme Court has similarly weighed 
codefendants’ sentences as part of a state statutory proportionality 
review.101
Some decisions on proportionality review, however, have pointed out 
that it is the role of the appellate court, not the jury, to perform such 
review. For example, the Court of Appeals of Virginia has noted that 
“[u]nder the mandated statutory review of capital cases, the Supreme 
Court must compare the sentence in a particular case to similar cases, but 
a jury has no such responsibility.”102
During the time that New Jersey had the death penalty, the state had 
one of the most rigorous proportionality review systems in the country. 
Like many other states, when New Jersey passed a new death penalty law 
after Furman, its law required the state supreme court, in every death 
penalty case, to determine whether the sentence was disproportionate to 
the punishment in similar cases.103 Although the New Jersey Legislature 
eventually attempted to weaken the importance of such review, in 1991 
                                                                                                                     
penalties in those states were recently held to be unconstitutional for unrelated reasons. See DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(g) (2019) (stating that the Delaware Supreme Court should determine 
“[w]hether, considering the totality of evidence in aggravation and mitigation . . . the death penalty
was either arbitrarily or capriciously imposed or recommended, or disproportionate to the penalty
recommended or imposed in similar cases arising under this section”), invalidated by Rauf v. 
State, 145 A.3d 430 (Del. 2016); Clark v. State, 672 A.2d 1004, 1010–11 (Del. 1996) (en banc) 
(applying the proportionality review required by Delaware’s statute). Although Washington 
state’s death penalty recently was found unconstitutional in State v. Gregory, 427 P.3d 621, 626
(Wash. 2018), when Washington had the death penalty, a state statute required proportionality 
review. See WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.130(2)(b) (2018) (requiring the Washington Supreme 
Court to determine “[w]hether the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty 
imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant”), invalidated by Gregory,
427 P.3d 621.
100. See State v. Hoffman, 851 P.2d 934, 943–44 (Idaho 1993) (holding that the defendant’s 
death sentence was not disproportionate or unjust in light of a codefendant’s sentence); State v. 
McKinney, 687 P.2d 570, 576 (Idaho 1984) (noting that under proportionality review required by 
statute, the differences in the sentences between the defendant and codefendant were “justified by 
the varying degrees of involvement in the crime”), dismissal of post-conviction relief aff’d, 992 
P.2d 144 (Idaho 1999), and denial of post-conviction relief aff’d, 291 P.3d 1036 (Idaho 2013), 
and dismissal of post-conviction relief aff’d, 396 P.3d 1168 (Idaho 2017).
101. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 705 P.2d 1087, 1108 (Mont. 1985).
102. Walker v. Commonwealth, 486 S.E.2d 126, 134 (Va. Ct. App. 1997), abrogated by
Fishback v. Commonwealth, 532 S.E.2d 629 (Va. 2000); see also Lewis v. Commonwealth, 593 
S.E.2d 220, 227 (Va. 2004) (“[U]pon our prior determinations of excessiveness and 
disproportionality, we have rejected efforts by defendants to compare their sentences with those 
received by confederates.” (quoting Murphy v. Commonwealth, 431 S.E.2d 48, 53 (Va. 1993))).
103. 1982 N.J. Laws 555, 558 (codified as amended at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3 (West 
2018)).
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the New Jersey Supreme Court began a Proportionality Review Project
that created “the most elaborate statistical proportionality review process 
in the nation.”104 Through the years, proportionality review by the New 
Jersey Supreme Court helped reduce the number of death sentences, and 
it likely contributed to the state ultimately abolishing the death penalty.105
Other states have yet to follow New Jersey’s history of extensive analysis 
in death penalty cases of comparing capital and noncapital cases. 
Further, even in states that perform a proportionality review, courts 
stress that there is no requirement that defendants and codefendants be 
sentenced alike.106 Different defendants may have different culpabilities, 
and courts may be reluctant to engage in comparing sentences without 
going into a detailed analysis of the codefendants’ mitigating and 
aggravating factors.107 A further question is whether juries are capable of 
doing that type of analysis when weighing mitigating factors.
II. THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IMPORTANT ROLE OF MITIGATING 
CIRCUMSTANCES IN CAPITAL CASES
In 1976, when the Supreme Court upheld the death penalty statutes in 
Gregg, Jurek, and Proffit, the Court also struck down mandatory death 
penalty statutes as violating the Eighth Amendment in Woodson v. North 
Carolina108 and in Roberts v. Louisiana.109 The Woodson and Roberts
cases stressed the importance of individualized sentencing and the role of 
mitigating factors presented by capital defendants.110
                                                                                                                     
104. Barry Latzer, The Failure of Comparative Proportionality Review of Capital Cases 
(With Lessons from New Jersey), 64 ALB. L. REV. 1161, 1197–98 (2001).
105. George W. Conk, Herald of Change? New Jersey’s Repeal of the Death Penalty, 33 
SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 21, 33–41 (2008).
106. See, e.g., State v. Gamble, 63 So. 3d 707, 726 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010). The court noted 
that Alabama has a statute requiring appellate courts to do proportionality review in capital cases. 
Id. at 728–29. But, “[t]he law does not require that each person involved in a crime receive the 
same sentence.” Id. at 726 (quoting Ex Parte McWhorter, 781 So. 2d 330 (Ala. 2000)).
107. See Issa v. Bradshaw, No. 1:03-cv-280, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121867, at *88–90 (S.D. 
Ohio Nov. 5, 2008) (finding the fact that defendant received a death sentence and the actual 
shooter only received life imprisonment was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of 
federal law on habeas review); Harlow v. State, 70 P.3d 179, 203–05 (Wyo. 2003) (finding that 
the defendant’s sentence was not disproportionate to his two codefendants’ sentences), denial of 
post-conviction relief aff’d, 105 P.3d 1049 (Wyo. 2005); see also Hopkinson v. State, 664 P.2d 
43, 63 (Wyo. 1983) (“Accomplices in crime need not be sentenced alike; a sentence should be
patterned to the individual defendant.”). 
108. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
109. 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
110. See Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304. In Roberts, the plurality explained that the crime of 
intentional murder of a police officer could not result in a mandatory death sentence. Roberts, 428 
U.S. at 335–36. More than ten years later, as in Woodson and Roberts, the Court struck down a 
mandatory death penalty statute in Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 85 (1987).
15
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The Woodson plurality noted that historically, mandatory death 
sentences created problems—including jury nullification.111 Thus, the 
Court reasoned that in death penalty cases the Eighth Amendment 
“requires consideration of the character and record of the individual 
offender and the circumstances of the particular offense as a 
constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty 
of death.”112 Individualized sentencing in capital cases is required 
because there is an increased need for reliability: “[T]he penalty of death 
is qualitatively different from a sentence of imprisonment, however 
long.”113 To ensure individualized sentencing, the Court concluded that a 
defendant has a constitutional right to present mitigating evidence to 
jurors.114 Woodson and Roberts, however, did not clarify how broad the 
command was, only that courts had to allow defendants to present at least 
some mitigating factors.115
Subsequent cases clarified the constitutional significance of 
mitigating circumstances. In Lockett v. Ohio,116 the Supreme Court found 
Ohio’s death penalty statute unconstitutional because it limited the 
mitigating factors a capital jury could weigh.117 Echoing language from 
Woodson, the Lockett plurality concluded that a sentencing jury should
“not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of
a defendant’s character or record and any of the circumstances of the 
offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than 
death.”118
The Supreme Court further stressed the broad command from Lockett
in subsequent cases. For example, in Skipper v. South Carolina,119 the 
Court included evidence unrelated to the crime in the definition of 
“mitigating evidence” when it held that a trial court could not exclude
evidence that the defendant had adjusted to incarceration.120 The Court 
noted that from such evidence a jury might have “drawn favorable 
inferences” with respect to the defendant’s character and probable future 
conduct.121 Thus, “[a]lthough it is true that any such inferences would not 
                                                                                                                     
111. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 294 n.29.
112. Id. at 304.
113. Id. at 305. 
114. Id. at 304.
115. Roberts, 428 U.S. at 333–34; Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304.
116. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
117. Id. at 608.
118. Id. at 604.
119. 476 U.S. 1 (1986).
120. Id. at 4 (“Equally clear is the corollary rule that the sentencer may not refuse to consider 
or be precluded from considering ‘any relevant mitigating evidence.’” (quoting Eddings v. 
Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 114 (1982))).
121. Id.
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relate specifically to petitioner’s culpability for the crime he committed, 
there is no question but that such inferences would be ‘mitigating’ in the 
sense that they might serve ‘as a basis for a sentence less than death.’”122
Similarly, in Eddings v. Oklahoma,123 the Court found other evidence 
not directly related to the crime to be mitigating. In that case, the Court 
found that evidence of a capital defendant’s troubled youth must be 
admitted for consideration during sentencing.124 Therefore, death penalty 
statutes must allow for the consideration of mitigating circumstances 
about the offense and the defendant’s character. Further, statutes and 
judges cannot limit consideration of the factors.125 Sentencers must be 
permitted to consider any information about “the circumstances of the 
offense together with the character and propensities of the offender.”126
The Supreme Court has consistently used broad language to define 
what circumstances constitute mitigating factors.127 For example, in 
McKoy v. North Carolina,128 the Court stressed that evidence is 
mitigating and cannot be constitutionally barred “if the sentencer could 
                                                                                                                     
122. Id. at 4–5 (citation omitted) (quoting Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604). The Court added that 
“[c]onsideration of a defendant’s past conduct as indicative of his probable future behavior is an 
inevitable and not undesirable element of criminal sentencing.” Id. at 5.
123. 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
124. Id. at 115.
125. See Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393, 398–99 (1987) (holding that the trial judge’s
instruction that did not allow the advisory jury to weigh nonstatutory mitigating factors violated 
the Constitution); see also Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 77–78 (1987) (clarifying that even in 
a situation where a life-sentenced prisoner commits murder, mitigation still must be considered
during a capital sentencing hearing). 
126. Eddings, 455 U.S. at 112 (quoting Pennsylvania v. Ashe, 302 U.S. 51, 55 (1937)).
127. Yet, the Court has implied that there might be some limits on what mitigation a 
sentencer is required to consider under the Constitution. In Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350 (1993), 
the Court evaluated Texas’s capital sentencing statute that presented special questions to jurors 
instead of a list of aggravating and mitigating factors. Id. at 354 (noting that the trial court 
instructed the jury to answer two issues in conformity with TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 
32.071(b) (West 1981), including whether “the conduct of the Defendant . . . that caused the death 
of the deceased” was “committed deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that the death 
of the deceased or another would result,” and whether there is “a probability that the 
Defendant . . . would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat 
to society”). At the time, Texas’s death penalty statute did not specifically provide for mitigating 
factors to be considered outside of these questions. Id. Johnson, who was nineteen at the time of 
the murder, argued that the sentencing questions did not allow the jury to consider youth as a 
mitigating factor. Id. at 353, 358, 366. The Court, however, held that Lockett only requires that a 
jury be permitted to weigh mitigating evidence and that the jury does not have to “be able to give 
effect to mitigating evidence in every conceivable manner in which the evidence might be 
relevant.” Id. at 372. Thus, the Court upheld the death sentence because the mitigating factor of 
youth could be considered in at least one way—how it affected the defendant’s future 
dangerousness. Id. at 371, 373.
128. 494 U.S. 433 (1990).
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reasonably find that it warrants a sentence less than death.”129 In that case, 
the Court approvingly cited the following definition from the North 
Carolina Supreme Court Chief Justice: “Relevant mitigating evidence is 
evidence which tends logically to prove or disprove some fact or 
circumstance which a fact-finder could reasonably deem to have 
mitigating value.”130 Further, evidence may still be relevant to mitigation 
even if it does not excuse a defendant’s conduct.131
Generally, death-penalty states’ sentencing statutes list some 
mitigating factors. But because the Constitution does not allow states to 
preclude consideration of mitigating factors,132 lower courts are often 
asked to consider what factors are mitigating under the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence. The Supreme Court has not provided definitive guidance 
as to what specific factors should be mitigating or why some factors are 
mitigating. Thus, on a case-by-case basis, lower courts have further 
developed the law of mitigating circumstances.
In making the legal and moral determination of whether a defendant 
should be executed, jurors consider certain mitigating factors presented 
by the defendant and approved by the trial court. And as discussed above, 
the Supreme Court has stated that a sentencer must “not be precluded 
from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant’s
character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the 
defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.”133
The definition is broad, although occasionally courts find that specific 
evidence does not constitute a mitigating circumstance.134 Still, courts 
                                                                                                                     
129. Id. at 441 (first citing Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986); and then citing
Eddings, 455 U.S. 104).
130. Id. at 440 (quoting State v. McKoy, 372 S.E.2d 12, 45 (N.C. 1988) (Exum, C.J., 
dissenting)).
131. Eddings, 455 U.S. at 113–16.
132. Many state statutes explicitly incorporate the command of Lockett that all mitigating 
evidence must be considered by including a catch-all provision among the list of specific statutory 
mitigating circumstances. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3(k) (West 2018) (“Any other 
circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for 
the crime.”); COLO. REV. STAT. 18-1.3-1201(4)(l) (2018) (“Any other evidence which in the 
court’s opinion bears on the question of mitigation.”); FLA. STAT. § 921.141(7)(h) (2018) (“The 
existence of any other factors in the defendant’s background that would mitigate against 
imposition of the death penalty.”); IND. CODE § 35-50-2-9 (c)(8) (2018) (“Any other 
circumstances appropriate for consideration.”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(f)(9) (2018) (“Any
other circumstance arising from the evidence which the jury deems to have mitigating value.”).
133. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (emphasis omitted).
134. Below are some examples of cases where courts found evidence did not constitute a 
mitigating factor. See, e.g., Madison v. State, 718 So. 2d 90, 96 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997) (holding 
that evidence from a defense expert that the defendant suffered from delusional and thought 
disorders was insufficient to support the mitigating circumstance of extreme mental or emotional 
disturbance), aff’d sub nom. ex parte Madison, 718 So. 2d 104 (Ala. 1998), denial of post-
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and legislatures have found a significant number of factors that should be 
considered mitigating in capital cases.
Generally, mitigating factors may be grouped into four categories: (1) 
mitigating circumstances unrelated to the crime that show that the 
defendant has some good qualities; (2) mitigating circumstances that 
show less culpability, that help explain why a defendant committed the 
crime, or both; (3) mitigating circumstances that show the defendant had 
a lesser involvement with the murder; and (4) mitigating circumstances 
related to the legal proceedings.135
The first category, regarding a defendant’s good qualities, is used to 
illustrate the defendant has done some good, revealing that the defendant 
is a human being who is worth saving from the death penalty.136 The 
second category includes factors that help explain why the defendant 
might be less culpable or that might evoke sympathy.137 A defendant who 
suffered severe abuse as a child is not excused for later committing a 
crime, but that fact might provide some context as to why the defendant 
ended up committing crimes. Like all mitigating factors, these do not 
mean that the defendant should not be punished; they merely support that 
the punishment should be life in prison instead of the death penalty.138
The third category focuses on the circumstances of the crime.139 For 
example, it would be mitigating if a defendant had codefendants who 
were more culpable in the murder. One might argue that the defendant 
should be sentenced to life in prison because of that defendant’s lesser 
                                                                                                                     
conviction relief aff’d, 999 So. 2d 561 (Ala. Crim. App. 2006); State v. Timmendequas, 737 A.2d
55, 115 (N.J. 1999) (holding that a capital defendant’s alleged offer to plead guilty in exchange 
for a life sentence was not a mitigating factor), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 2011 WL 2326967 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. June 14, 2011); State v. Morton, 715 A.2d 228, 270 (N.J. 1998) (holding 
that parole ineligibility is not a mitigating factor); State v. Torres, 713 A.2d 1, 18 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1998) (holding that a sixteen-year-old defendant’s age was not a mitigating factor 
because the crime was not of a nature consistent with youth), denial of post-conviction relief aff’d,
2007 WL 2005047 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 12, 2007), and denial of post-conviction relief 
aff’d, No. A-2225-15T4 A-5597-15T4, 2018 WL 1056252 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Feb. 7,
2018); State v. Clark, 990 P.2d 793, 805–06 (N.M. 1999) (holding that the fact that the former 
governor had commuted prior death sentences to life imprisonment was not a mitigating factor,
that the opinions of friends or relatives of the defendant that defendant should not be sentenced to 
death are not mitigating circumstances, and that the testimony of religious leaders and lawyers as 
to the propriety of the death sentence was not relevant mitigating evidence). 
135. See, e.g., Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, A Tear in the Eye of the Law: Mitigating Factors and 
the Progression Toward a Disease Theory of Criminal Justice, 83 OR. L. REV. 631, 658–87 (2004) 
(categorizing mitigating factors from around the United States).
136. Id. at 664–65.
137. Id. at 671.
138. See id. at 664.
139. Id. at 665–72.
19
Kirchmeier: Beyond Compare: A Codefendant's Prison Sentence as a Mitigating F
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository,
1036 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71
involvement in the murder. Similarly, other circumstances surrounding 
the crime might support arguments for a lesser sentence than death.140
Finally, the fourth category of mitigating factors includes factors that 
are based on aspects of the capital prosecution that go toward making the 
prosecution fairer.141 For example, some courts have found that a 
recommendation of life in prison by a prosecutor or by the victim’s family 
is mitigating.142
For another example of a factor related to legal proceedings, some 
judges have suggested that a difference in jurisdiction that would affect 
the sentence should be mitigating. In United States v. Gabrion,143 a
defendant was prosecuted under federal law because the victim’s body 
was found in a national forest.144 But had the body been outside the forest, 
the defendant would not have been eligible for the death penalty because 
under Michigan state law there is no death penalty.145 Initially, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that a capital jury should have 
been allowed to consider the mitigating factor that the state did not have 
the death penalty.146 The appeals court later granted a rehearing and 
reversed the earlier decision, but Judge Karen Moore’s dissent reasserted,
“When the location of the crime is what makes a defendant eligible for 
                                                                                                                     
140. See id.
141. Id. at 672–73. In addition to the factors discussed above, two other factors that might fit 
in this category are the factors of whether the defendant is ineligible for parole and the length of 
legal proceedings. Regarding parole ineligibility, at least in cases where the prosecution has 
placed the defendant’s “future dangerousness” at issue, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment gives the defendant the right to inform the jury that she or he is ineligible for parole 
if sentenced to life in prison. Shafer v. South Carolina, 532 U.S. 36, 51 (2001); Simmons v. South 
Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 171 (1994). The factor is listed here, though arguably it is not a mitigating 
factor, but more like rebuttal to the aggravating factor of future dangerousness. Regarding the 
length of legal proceedings factor, in State v. Adamson, 665 P.2d 972 (Ariz. 1983) (en banc),
while upholding a death sentence, the court considered the length of the legal proceedings in the 
case as a mitigating factor. Id. at 989.
142. See, e.g., Jeffers v. Ricketts, 627 F. Supp. 1334, 1357–59 (D. Ariz. 1986) (noting that 
the prosecutor offered a plea bargain that did not involve a death sentence), aff’d, 38 F.3d 411 
(9th Cir. 1994); State v. White, 982 P.2d 819, 825, 831 (Ariz. 1999) (affirming the death sentence 
but holding that the trial judge erred by not finding a mitigating circumstance that the two 
prosecutors did not believe that death was the appropriate sentence); see also Ferguson v. State, 
814 So. 2d 925, 959 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000) (noting that the trial court found the nonstatutory 
mitigating factor that the jury recommended a sentence of life imprisonment without the 
possibility of parole), aff’d sub nom. ex parte Ferguson, 814 So.2d 970 (Ala. 2001), dismissal of 
post-conviction relief aff’d, 13 So.3d 418 (Ala. Crim. App. 2008).
143. 648 F.3d 307 (6th Cir. 2011), vacated, No. 02-1386/1461/1570, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 
23290 (6th Cir. Nov. 17, 2011), and reh’g en banc 719 F.3d 511 (6th Cir. 2013).
144. Id. at 316.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 323–24.
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the death penalty in the first place, the location becomes a ‘circumstance 
of the offense’ that could justify a sentence less than death.”147
A final mitigating factor, which could belong in either the third or the 
fourth category, is the topic of this Article: that a codefendant has 
received a life sentence. This factor arguably relates to the fairness of the 
criminal proceeding and to the circumstances of the crime. Courts are 
divided on whether this factor should be mitigating, with some courts 
concluding that the factor does not qualify under the Supreme Court’s 
definition of a mitigating factor: “any aspect of a defendant’s character 
or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant 
proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.”148 The next part 
discusses how states and lower courts have addressed this issue.
III. DOES THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT REQUIRE JURIES TO CONSIDER A
CODEFENDANT’S SENTENCE AS A MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE?
The Supreme Court has not expressly addressed whether the Eighth 
Amendment requires that a defendant be allowed to introduce a
codefendant’s non-death sentence as a mitigating factor in a capital case. 
As noted above, however, the Court often has used broad language in 
favor of allowing juries to consider anything that might be mitigating. 
In at least one instance, the Court arguably implied approval of 
considering a codefendant’s non-death sentence as a mitigating factor. In 
Parker v. Dugger,149 the Court held that the Florida Supreme Court did 
not properly review a capital sentence because the state court incorrectly 
found that the trial judge had not found any nonstatutory mitigating 
factors.150 The U.S. Supreme Court concluded that the trial court must 
have found some nonstatutory mitigating factors even if the trial court’s 
order was ambiguous.151 In making its conclusion, the Court noted that 
the defendant’s attorney had argued several mitigating factors at the 
sentencing hearing, including that none of the accomplices were 
sentenced to death.152
In analyzing how the state courts had evaluated mitigating 
circumstances, the Supreme Court noted that the defendant’s 
“nonstatutory mitigating evidence—drug and alcohol intoxication, more 
lenient sentencing for the perpetrator of the crime, character and 
background—was of a type that the Florida Supreme Court had in other 
                                                                                                                     
147. Id. at 540 (Moore, J., dissenting).
148. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978).
149. 498 U.S. 308 (1991).
150. Id. at 322–23.
151. Id. at 314–15.
152. Id. at 314.
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cases found sufficient to preclude a jury override.”153 The Court further 
explained, “The trial judge must have at least taken this evidence into 
account before passing sentence.”154
By listing the sentencing of another person as a factor that the trial 
judge must have considered, the Court’s reasoning seems to support its 
approval of the mitigating circumstance. On the other hand, one might 
argue that the Court was only recognizing that the factor was mitigating 
under state law.155 Thus, the decision in Parker gives some insight into 
the Court’s view, but it does not definitively resolve the issue.
Although the Supreme Court has not expressly addressed whether 
courts must weigh a codefendant’s non-death sentence as mitigating, 
some legislatures and several lower courts have addressed the issue.
Indeed, regardless of the U.S. Constitution, states—through statutes or 
through interpretation of a state constitution—may require that a 
defendant be able to use such mitigating evidence. 
But, because Lockett held that states may not prevent a defendant from 
presenting evidence that is mitigating, the issue remains whether states 
are required to allow evidence of a codefendant’s sentence to be 
considered as a nonstatutory mitigating factor. The courts are not uniform 
on the issue.
A. Jurisdictions Holding that a Codefendant’s Sentence Is 
Mitigating Evidence
As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has noted, courts 
are divided on the issue of whether the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments dictate that a defendant may submit evidence of a 
codefendant’s sentence as mitigation. In Frey v. Fulcomer,156 in 
evaluating an ineffective assistance of counsel claim for counsel’s failure 
to attempt to introduce a codefendant’s sentence as mitigating, the court 
recognized that Pennsylvania law did not allow such mitigating 
evidence.157 But “[i]t remains less clear whether the federal constitution 
(specifically the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments) requires that 
codefendants’ sentences must be admitted as mitigating evidence in a 
                                                                                                                     
153. Id. at 315.
154. Id.
155. The Supreme Court in Parker, however, did note that the state court could not decline 
to consider mitigating evidence as a matter of “both federal and Florida law.” Parker, 498 U.S. at 
315.
156. 974 F.2d 348 (3d Cir. 1992).
157. Id. at 366.
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death penalty hearing.”158 The court, however, reasoned that it did not 
need to resolve the mitigating issue for the case before it.159
In contrast to federal courts,160 several state courts have allowed a 
capital defendant to use a codefendant’s sentence as a mitigating factor, 
including courts in Arizona,161 Colorado,162 Delaware,163 Florida,164
                                                                                                                     
158. Id. The court did note that Parker v. Dugger did not require consideration of such 
evidence as part of proportionality review. Id. at 366 n.22.
159. Id. at 366. Notably, the federal capital sentencing statute allows consideration of a 
codefendant’s sentence when the defendant and codefendant are “equally culpable.” 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3592(a)(4) (2012).
160. As discussed in the next part, generally federal courts have declined to require that 
courts allow a defendant to present a codefendant’s sentence as mitigating. See infra Part III.B. In 
many of those cases, though, that result is at least partly due to deferential review of state death 
penalty cases on habeas corpus review. See infra Part III.B.
161. See, e.g., State v. Bearup, 211 P.3d 684, 694–95 (Ariz. 2009) (en banc); State v. Schurz, 
859 P.2d 156, 167 (Ariz. 1993) (en banc).
162. See, e.g., Woldt v. People, 64 P.3d 256, 260 n.8 (Colo. 2003) (en banc) (noting the panel 
considered the mitigating factor of the codefendant’s life sentence).
163. See, e.g., Garden v. State, 844 A.2d 311, 317 (Del. 2004) (agreeing that a codefendant’s 
life sentence has long been viewed as a relevant sentencing factor), superseded on other grounds 
by statute, 74 Del. Laws 174 (2003), as recognized in Starling v. State, 882 A.2d 747, 759 (Del. 
2005); State v. Ferguson, 642 A.2d 1267, 1267–68 (Del. Super. Ct. 1992) (holding that a 
codefendant’s sentence is a mitigating circumstance that is admissible at a sentencing hearing);
see also Rauf v. State, 145 A.3d 430, 433–34 (Del. 2016) (finding Delaware’s death penalty 
unconstitutional).
164. Florida trial and appellate courts often consider comparable codefendant sentences in 
capital cases as part of proportionality review. See, e.g., Jeffries v. State, 222 So. 3d 538, 548 (Fla. 
2017) (finding that trial court applied the correct law regarding relative culpability of 
codefendants); Sexton v. State, 775 So. 2d 923, 935–36 (Fla. 2000) (“Florida case law is clear—
a defendant may not be sentenced to death if a more culpable co-defendant has been sentenced to 
life imprisonment or less. This reasoning probably also extends to equally culpable co-
defendants.”), denial of post-conviction relief aff’d, 997 So. 2d 1073 (Fla. 2008). Because of the 
state’s concern about proportionality in capital cases, courts sometimes extend that concern and 
cite those cases in weighing whether to allow juries to consider codefendant sentences as a 
mitigating factor. See Gonzalez v. State, 136 So. 3d 1125, 1165 (Fla. 2014) (concluding that 
because the trial court found that the defendant’s death sentence was not disproportional to that 
of his codefendants, “[t]he trial court committed no error in rejecting the disparate sentences of 
the codefendants as a mitigating circumstance”), denial of post-conviction relief aff’d, 253 So. 3d 
526 (Fla. 2018); see also Messer v. State, 330 So. 2d 137, 141–42 (Fla. 1976) (holding that a 
sentencing jury was entitled to know that the codefendant negotiated a plea to second degree 
murder and was sentenced to thirty years in prison); Slater v. State, 316 So. 2d 539, 542 (Fla. 
1975) (finding that under Furman v. Georgia, the disparity between the death sentence for the 
accomplice defendant and a life in prison sentence for the “triggerman” was not equal justice 
under the law).
23
Kirchmeier: Beyond Compare: A Codefendant's Prison Sentence as a Mitigating F
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository,
1040 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71
Illinois,165 Kansas,166 Maryland,167 and Ohio.168 Some jurisdictions 
specifically mention this mitigating factor in their capital sentencing 
statutes. For example, the federal death penalty statute allows
consideration of the codefendant factor.169 Similarly, New Hampshire’s 
death penalty statute offers the following mitigating factor: “Another 
defendant or defendants, equally culpable in the crime, will not be 
punished by death.”170 Legislators in these jurisdictions have determined 
that the information is relevant and included the mitigating factor as a 
policy choice, whether or not there is a constitutional mandate for the 
factor.
Many state courts have stressed the relevance of the sentence of an 
equally culpable codefendant for sentencing a capital defendant.171 As 
noted earlier, jurisdictions can require consideration of a codefendant’s 
sentence as a mitigating factor by statute or under the state constitution.172
                                                                                                                     
165. See, e.g., People v. Gleckler, 411 N.E.2d 849, 858–61 (Ill. 1980) (vacating a sentence 
of death based in part upon an accomplice’s life sentence). Illinois, however, abolished the death 
penalty in 2011. See Kevin M. Barry, The Law of Abolition, 107 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 521, 
530 (2017).
166. State v. Deiterman, 29 P.3d 411, 423 (Kan. 2001) (considering the mitigating factor of 
the sentences of coconspirators). 
167. See, e.g., Bryant v. State, 824 A.2d 60, 78 (Md. 2003) (“[T]he sentencing authority has 
broad discretion to consider the disproportionate sentence of a co-defendant . . . but there is no 
legislative requirement it do so.”); Johnson v. State, 495 A.2d 1, 17 (Md. 1985) (stating that a jury 
is given broad discretion to conclude that a codefendant’s sentence is a mitigating factor or to 
disregard the information).
168. See, e.g., State v. Dean, 54 N.E.3d 80, 146 (Ohio 2015) (noting that a codefendant’s 
lesser sentence should be considered as a nonstatutory mitigating factor but finding in that case 
the factor did not deserve significant weight); State v. Getsy, 702 N.E.2d 866, 892 (Ohio 1998) 
(finding command for the treatment of a codefendant’s sentence as mitigating in Supreme Court 
precedent), dismissal of post-conviction relief aff’d, No. 98-T-0140, 1999 WL 1073682 (Ohio Ct. 
App. Oct. 22, 1999), denial of habeas corpus aff’d sub nom. Getsy v. Mitchell, 495 F.3d 295 (6th 
Cir. 2007).
169. See 18 U.S.C. § 3592(a)(4) (2012) (requiring the jury to consider as a mitigating factor 
that “[a]nother defendant or defendants, equally culpable in the crime, will not be punished by 
death”); see also 21 U.S.C. § 848(m)(8) (2000) (repealed 2006) (“Another defendant or 
defendants, equally culpable in the crime, will not be punished by death.”); United States v. 
Simoy, 50 M.J. 1, 3 (C.A.A.F. 1998) (Sullivan, J., concurring) (reasoning in part based on the 
Federal Death Penalty Act that the trial court erred in not allowing evidence of a codefendant’s 
sentence); id. (Gierke, J., concurring) (concluding the same with similar reasoning to Judge 
Sullivan’s).
170. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:5(VI)(g) (2018).
171. See, e.g., Lowery v. State, 547 N.E.2d 1046, 1059 (Ind. 1989); State v. Clark, 990 P.2d 
793, 806 (N.M. 1999).
172. Similarly, the Alabama Supreme Court has relied upon a state statute requiring death 
sentences not be excessive or disproportionate to the punishment in similar cases to hold that a 
trial court did not give proper mitigating weight to the fact that the defendant was the only one of 
24
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Regarding statutes, the circumstance may be listed specifically, or courts 
may find it as part of interpreting a catchall provision in the state’s death 
penalty statute.173 Some jurisdictions provide for appellate courts to 
consider a codefendant’s sentence as part of a proportionality review.174
And in other jurisdictions, a codefendant’s sentence may be considered 
both by a jury as a mitigating factor at trial and during appellate 
proportionality review.175 The open question, though, is whether, in 
jurisdictions without statutes requiring that a codefendant’s sentence be 
considered as a mitigating factor, the United States Constitution requires 
jurors to weigh the factor.
The highest courts in Arizona, Delaware, and Florida have concluded 
that the life sentence of an equally culpable codefendant is relevant as 
mitigating evidence for a jury to consider.176 For example, the Arizona 
                                                                                                                     
six participants in the crime who was prosecuted. Ex parte Burgess, 811 So. 2d 617, 628 (Ala. 
2010) (citing ALA. CODE § 13A-5-53(b)(3) (2010)).
173. See State v. Green, 609 N.E.2d 1253, 1263 (Ohio 1993) (concluding that a
codefendant’s sentence should be considered under the catchall section of state’s statute); see also
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(f)(9) (2018) (“Any other circumstance arising from the evidence 
which the jury deems to have mitigating value.”); Flanagan v. State, 810 P.2d 759, 762 (Nev.
1991) (holding that the prosecutor’s introduction of information about the sentences of 
codefendants was admissible under a statute allowing “any other matter which the court deems 
relevant” (quoting NEV. REV. STAT. § 175.552 (1991))), vacated, 503 U.S. 931 (1992), and
vacated sub nom. Moore v. Nevada, 503 U.S. 930 (1992); State v. Roseboro, 528 S.E.2d 1, 8 
(N.C. 2000) (stating that although a codefendant’s sentence is not relevant to the defendant’s 
character or the circumstances of the crime, an accomplice’s sentence may still be considered as 
a mitigating circumstance under the state statute’s catchall mitigating factor provision); cf. State 
v. Smith, 532 S.E.2d 773, 793–94 (N.C. 2000) (citing State v. Williams, 292 S.E.2d 243, 261–62
(N.C. 1982)) (holding that an accomplice’s punishment is not part of the defendant’s character 
nor a mitigating factor).
174. See, e.g., McWhorter v. State, 781 So. 2d 257, 329 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999) (considering
a codefendant’s sentence during proportionality review), aff’d sub nom. Ex parte McWhorter, 781 
So. 2d 330 (Ala. 2000), denial of post-conviction relief aff’d, 142 So. 3d 1195 (Ala. Crim. App. 
2011); State v. Stokes, 352 S.E.2d 653, 667 (N.C. 1987) (considering a codefendant’s life sentence 
during proportionality review).
175. See, e.g., Riley v. State, 496 A.2d 997, 1026 (Del. 1985) (noting, while conducting 
proportionality review, that a codefendant’s sentence was also submitted as a mitigating factor); 
Ray v. State, 755 So. 2d 604, 611–12 (Fla. 2000) (holding that a defendant’s sentence was 
disproportionate when a codefendant received a life sentence).
176. See, e.g., Campbell v. State, 571 So. 2d 415, 419 n.4 (Fla. 1990) (stating that trial courts 
should consider the mitigating factor of disparate treatment of similar codefendants), abrogated 
by Trease v. State 768 So.2d 1050 (Fla. 2000). Also, in Messer v. State, the trial court had allowed 
a sentencing jury to know that a codefendant was sentenced to thirty years in prison even though 
the codefendant had negotiated a plea. Messer v. State, 403 So. 2d 341, 347 (Fla. 1981); see also
Slater v. State, 316 So. 2d 539, 542 (Fla. 1975) (overruling a death sentence and holding that a 
codefendant’s sentence was a mitigating factor even though the codefendant had pleaded nolo 
contendere). In Florida, the state’s statute does not specifically list a codefendant’s sentence as a 
mitigating factor, although the statute contains the mitigating factor that “[t]he defendant was an 
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Supreme Court, in State v. Marlow,177 weighed a codefendant’s sentence 
in changing a defendant’s sentence from death to life in prison.178 The 
court found that the “dramatic disparity” between the defendant’s death 
sentence and his codefendant’s four-year prison sentence was a 
mitigating factor that the trial court failed to consider.179 The court further 
explained that even though the codefendant had accepted a plea deal, 
because both defendants were originally charged with murder in the first 
degree, “[i]t makes no difference whether the dramatic disparity in 
sentences created by the prosecutor’s plea offer resulted from tactical 
considerations at trial or from who won the race to the prosecutor’s 
door.”180
Courts have found the sentencing disparity as a mitigating factor in 
other cases where the codefendant pleaded guilty and did not go to trial. 
For example, in State v. Cabrera,181 a Delaware Superior Court 
recognized that a codefendant had received a lighter sentence as the result 
of a plea bargain for assisting the State in its case against the defendant.182
But the court, noting that the codefendant’s involvement in the crime was 
still significant, reasoned that the capital defendant could still use the 
sentence disparity as mitigating evidence.183
                                                                                                                     
accomplice in the capital felony committed by another person and his or her participation was 
relatively minor.” FLA. STAT. § 921.141(7)(d) (2018).
177. 786 P.2d 395 (Ariz. 1989) (en banc).
178. Id. at 402. While Arizona is among the jurisdictions that have required consideration of 
this mitigating factor, in other ways Arizona has generally been restrictive on mitigating factors. 
Arizona courts held for fifteen years that defendants had to show a causal nexus between 
mitigating factor and crime. McKinney v. Ryan, 813 F.3d 798, 803 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc). In 
2015, in McKinney v. Ryan, the Ninth Circuit held this practice was unconstitutional. See id. at 
803–05 (holding that the Arizona Supreme Court applied a causal nexus rule to mitigating 
evidence contrary to Eddings v. Oklahoma in a number of cases); see also Styers v. Ryan, 811 
F.3d 292, 298–99 (9th Cir. 2015) (discussing the procedures for the Arizona Supreme Court to 
review cases with claims based upon McKinney v. Ryan).
179. Marlow, 786 P.2d at 401–02. Arizona’s death penalty sentencing statute does not 
specifically list a codefendant’s sentence as a mitigating factor, so the basis for the court decisions 
requiring it must be from the U.S. Constitution, the Arizona constitution, or both. See ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-751(G) (2018).
180. Marlow, 786 P.2d at 402.
181. No. 9703012700, 1999 WL 41630 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 21, 1999), aff’d on other 
grounds, 747 A.2d 543 (Del. 2000).
182. Cabrera, 1999 WL 41630, at *11. In 2016, the Supreme Court of Delaware held that 
the state’s death penalty statute violated the U.S. Constitution because it allowed a judge instead 
of a unanimous jury to find aggravating circumstances. See Rauf v. State, 145 A.3d 430, 433 (Del. 
2016).
183. Cabrera, 1999 WL 41630, at *11. The codefendant held the elderly victim as the 
defendant worked to smother the victim. Id. at *10–11. Additionally, the codefendant helped 
dispose of the body. Id. at *11. Although the codefendant was remorseful and had testified against 
the defendant, the court considered the fact that the codefendant “was permitted to plea to Second 
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If a capital defendant has the sentence disparity mitigating factor, it 
does not automatically mean that the defendant will receive a life 
sentence. Courts that evaluate the mitigating circumstance often weigh 
the relative culpabilities of the capital defendant and the codefendant to 
assess whether their involvement in the murder justifies a disparate 
sentence.184 In these cases, courts often perform significant analyses
comparing the culpability of the defendant and the codefendant. In State 
v. Bearup,185 the Arizona Supreme Court reasoned that codefendants’ 
sentences were mitigating, but in that case the factor only carried limited 
weight because the disparity in the sentences resulted from the fact that 
the codefendants made plea bargains, and also because the defendant had 
additional aggravating factors.186
In Bearup, the court first discussed the importance of whether the 
disparity in sentences can be explained. It stressed, “A disparity in
sentences between codefendants and/or accomplices can be a mitigating 
circumstance if no reasonable explanation exists for the disparity.”187
Therefore, “[o]nly the unexplained disparity is significant.”188 The court 
added, though, that “even [an] unexplained disparity has little 
significance” in some cases where a jury finds the aggravating 
circumstance that the murder was “especially cruel, heinous or 
depraved.”189
                                                                                                                     
Degree Murder as a mitigating circumstance.” Id. at *10–11. As in Arizona, in Delaware the 
existence of the mitigating factor is not based on a state statute listing the mitigating circumstance. 
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209 (2019), invalidated by Rauf v. State, 145 A.3d 430 (Del. 
2016). Note, however, that the Delaware Supreme Court subsequently found Delaware’s death 
penalty unconstitutional for reasons unrelated to this mitigating factor. See Rauf v. State, 145 A.3d 
430, 433–34 (Del. 2016) (finding Delaware’s death penalty unconstitutional).
184. See Marlow, 786 P.2d at 402; State v. Gerlaugh, 659 P.2d 642, 644 (Ariz. 1983) 
(Cameron, J., concurring); see also Arthur v. State, 711 So. 2d 1031, 1096–97 (Ala. Crim. App. 
1996) (holding that the disparity of treatment between the appellant and his accomplices was a 
nonstatutory mitigating circumstance), aff’d sub nom. Ex parte Arthur, 711 So. 2d 1097 (Ala. 
1997).
185. 211 P.3d 684 (Ariz. 2009).
186. Id. at 695–96. Although Bearup and other Arizona cases hold that a codefendant’s 
sentence may constitute a mitigating circumstance in some situations, some earlier Arizona cases 
stressed the importance of such evidence for proportionality purposes. See id.; see, e.g., State v. 
Lambright, 673 P.2d 1, 15 (Ariz. 1983) (“We must remind prosecuting attorneys that the favorable 
treatment accorded to an accomplice can, under different facts, be given weight in considering the 
proportionality of a capital sentence.”), overruled on other grounds by Hedlund v. Sheldon, 840 
P.2d 1008 (Ariz. 1992).
187. Bearup, 211 P.3d at 695 (quoting State v. Kayer, 984 P.2d 31, 47 (Ariz. 1999)).
188. Id. (quoting State v. Ellison, 140 P.3d 899, 923 (Ariz. 2006)).
189. Id. (quoting Ellison, 140 P.3d at 923); see also Lambright, 673 P.2d at 13–14 (affirming 
a defendant’s death sentence because of the cruel, heinous and depraved nature of the defendant’s 
offense outweighed the mitigating factors presented by the defendant, including the immunity 
granted to an accomplice); Gerlaugh, 659 P.2d at 644 (Cameron, J., concurring) (holding that the 
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In its analysis, the Arizona Supreme Court then proceeded to compare 
Bearup’s facts to other cases involving sentencing disparities.190 It 
concluded that the mitigating circumstance should carry only limited 
weight “in light of the reasonable explanations for the disparity,” which 
included that the defendant had an extensive criminal history, the 
defendant was older than the nineteen-year-old codefendant, the 
codefendant had a “more limited role in the crimes,” and the 
codefendant’s testimony helped the case against the defendant.191
Jurisdictions that hold that a codefendant’s prison sentence may be 
mitigating often do not discuss why such evidence is mitigating or why 
the U.S. Constitution requires consideration of the specific mitigating 
circumstance.192 Generally, at most, a court may briefly find support for 
the conclusion that a codefendant’s sentence is a nonstatutory mitigating 
factor based on implications from Supreme Court precedent.193 But even 
if courts do not delve into the reasoning for the legal principle, they often 
do extensive analysis of the facts, as in the Bearup case, comparing the 
culpability of the defendants and codefendants, while also considering 
other reasons that might justify the disparity.194 Thus, in these cases, the 
                                                                                                                     
different sentences of a defendant and an accomplice were proportionate in light of the 
accomplice’s mitigating circumstances and the defendant’s aggravating circumstances). Although 
the Bearup court noted that an “unexplained disparity [may have] little significance” in cases 
where “the murder [was] especially cruel, heinous, or depraved,” the court proceeded to discuss 
its decision in Marlow, a case where a “dramatic disparity in sentences [was] sufficient to require 
reduction” of a death sentence to a life sentence despite the aggravating circumstances of the 
defendant’s offense. Bearup, 211 P.3d at 695 (quoting Ellison, 140 P.3d at 923) (citing Marlow,
786 P.2d at 402).
190. Bearup, 211 P.3d at 695–96.
191. Id.
192. See, e.g., State v. White, 982 P.2d 819, 827 (Ariz. 1999) (“Unexplained disparity 
between the sentences of a defendant and codefendant may be a mitigating factor in a capital 
case.”); State v. Schurz, 859 P.2d 156, 167 (Ariz. 1993) (“This court has on occasion considered 
as a mitigating factor the disparity between the sentence of a defendant sentenced to death and a 
codefendant or accomplice sentenced to some term of imprisonment.”); Heath v. State, 648 So. 
2d 660, 665–66 (Fla. 1994) (explaining how a sentencing court balanced the relative culpability 
of a defendant and a codefendant); Williams v. State, 622 So. 2d 456, 464, 465 (Fla. 1993) 
(upholding the trial judge’s override of the jury’s recommendation of a life sentence, in part 
because a disparity in a codefendant’s sentence in the case would not justify a life sentence for 
the defendant). 
193. For example, the Supreme Court of Ohio found that “[i]n Parker v. Dugger, the United 
States Supreme Court implicitly recognized that a codefendant’s sentence could be considered a 
nonstatutory mitigating factor.” State v. Getsy, 702 N.E.2d 866, 892 (Ohio 1998) (citation 
omitted) (citing Parker v. Dugger, 498 U.S. 308 (1991)).
194. See Bearup, 211 P.3d at 695–96; see also State v. Lynch, 357 P.3d 119, 142 (Ariz. 
2015) (finding that where the defendant “was the killer, and [the codefendant] received a life 
sentence as a result of a plea agreement,” the “[s]entencing disparity [was] not a mitigating
circumstance”), rev’d on other grounds, Lynch v. Arizona, 136 S. Ct. 1818 (2016); State v. 
Carlson, 48 P.3d 1180, 1197, 1198 (Ariz. 2002) (finding that a sentencing disparity was mitigating 
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information regarding the mitigating factor provides jurors with detailed 
insight into the case and the defendants.
B.  Jurisdictions Holding that a Codefendant’s Sentence Is Not 
Mitigating Evidence
By contrast, several jurisdictions have held that the U.S. Constitution 
does not require sentencing juries to weigh a codefendant’s sentence as a
mitigating factor.195 In these decisions, courts generally base their 
conclusion on one reason. They rely upon the Supreme Court language 
defining a mitigating factor as an aspect of the defendant’s character or
record or any of the circumstances of the offense.196 From that definition, 
these courts then conclude that the codefendant factor does not fit within 
any of those categories.
Federal courts from the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits 
generally have found that the Eighth Amendment does not mandate that 
a capital defendant may introduce evidence of a codefendant’s sentence 
as mitigating.197 But recent federal decisions reviewing state court 
                                                                                                                     
where the defendant who hired the killer was sentenced to death and the actual killer received a 
life sentence).
195. See, e.g., State v. Koskovich, 776 A.2d 144, 202–03, 204 (N.J. 2001) (holding that “the 
trial court correctly chose not to instruct the jury about [a codefendant’s] sentence as an 
independent mitigating factor under [New Jersey’s death penalty statute]” and upholding the 
constitutionality of that statute “under the Eighth Amendment to the federal Constitution” 
(quoting State v. Ramseur, 524 A.2d 188 (N.J. 1987))); State v. Brown, 651 A.2d 19, 55, 56 (N.J. 
1994) (rejecting a defendant’s claim that a sentencing jury should be allowed to consider an 
accomplice’s sentence as a mitigating factor and holding that such consideration is not required 
under the U.S. Constitution), overruled on other grounds by State v. Cooper, 700 A.2d 306, 331 
(N.J. 1997); State v. Smith, 532 S.E.2d 773, 793–94 (N.C. 2000) (holding that a trial court 
properly barred the jury from considering a codefendant’s sentence because an “accomplice[’s] 
punishment is not an aspect of the defendant’s character . . . nor a mitigating circumstance of the 
particular offense” (quoting State v. Williams, 292 S.E.2d 243, 261–62 (N.C. 1982))); State v. 
Berry, 650 N.E.2d 433, 443 (Ohio 1995) (rejecting, without explanation, an appellant’s argument 
that an accomplice’s life sentence should be considered as mitigation); Commonwealth v. Frey, 
554 A.2d 27, 33 (Pa. 1989) (“The sentence received by a co-conspirator [was] not a mitigating 
circumstance . . . .”); State v. Charping, 508 S.E.2d 851, 856 (S.C. 1998) (“The trial court properly 
excluded evidence of [a codefendant’s] convictions and sentence.”); cf. State v. Henley, 774 
S.W.2d 908, 918 (Tenn. 1989) (citing State v. Carter, 714 S.W.2d 241, 251 (Tenn. 1986)) (holding 
that a rational basis for a sentencing disparity existed when a codefendant received a lesser penalty 
than the defendant because the codefendant did not initiate the crimes and participated out of fear 
for his life).
196. See, e.g., Brown, 651 A.2d at 55.
197. See, e.g., Meyer v. Branker, 506 F.3d 358, 375 (4th Cir. 2007); Beardslee v. Woodford, 
358 F.3d 560, 579 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Although a trial court is not necessarily precluded from 
allowing consideration of co-defendant sentences, a trial court does not commit constitutional 
error under Lockett by refusing to allow such evidence.”); Schneider v. Delo, 85 F.3d 335, 342 
(8th Cir. 1996) (agreeing with the Missouri Supreme Court’s holding that the codefendant’s thirty-
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decisions apply a deferential federal habeas corpus standard of review 
under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996198
(AEDPA).199 Thus, under AEDPA, a federal habeas court may only issue 
the writ in cases “where there is no possibility fair-minded jurists could 
disagree that the state court’s decision conflicts with [the Supreme 
Court’s] precedents.”200
Because of the deferential review standard, federal courts therefore 
generally do not reverse a state decision precluding the admission of a 
codefendant’s sentence. Still, several federal courts have stated that the 
codefendant factor does not appear to meet the definition of relevant 
mitigating evidence. For example, in Meyer v. Branker,201 the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld a North Carolina Supreme Court 
decision preventing a defendant from introducing his codefendant’s 
sentence into evidence.202 The Court of Appeals reasoned, “Since a co-
perpetrator’s sentence is neither an aspect of the defendant’s character or 
record nor a circumstance of the offense, . . . it is within ‘the traditional 
authority of a court to exclude’ such evidence as ‘irrelevant’” under 
Lockett.203 The court explained that it was holding only that the U.S. 
Constitution did not require the admission of such evidence and that 
states were at liberty to adopt their own guidelines requiring the factor.204
                                                                                                                     
year prison term “had nothing to do with [the defendant’s] ‘character or record’ or with the 
‘circumstances of the offense’” (quoting State v. Schneider, 736 S.W.2d 392, 395–97 (Mo. 
1987))); Brogdon v. Blackburn, 790 F.2d 1164, 1169 (5th Cir. 1986) (stating that a codefendant’s 
life sentence is not a relevant mitigating factor). But see Morris v. U.S. District Court, 363 F.3d 
891, 897 (9th Cir. 2004) (Ferguson, J., concurring specially) (noting an exception to allow for 
consideration of a codefendant’s sentence as a mitigating factor where the prosecutor concedes 
that a harsher penalty was selected for the defendant while also conceding that the codefendant 
was equally as guilty).
198. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012)).
199. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102, 113 (2016). Federal 
habeas corpus courts applying pre-AEDPA law reviewed legal questions and mixed questions of 
law and fact with a de novo standard of review. See, e.g., JAMES S. LIEBMAN & RANDY HERTZ, 2 
FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 30.2, at 956–57 (2d ed. 1994); Chris 
Hutton, The “New” Federal Habeas: Implications for State Standards of Review, 40 S.D. L. REV.
442, 463 (1995); Note, Rewriting the Great Writ: Standards of Review for Habeas Corpus Under 
the New 28 U.S.C. § 2254, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1868, 1869–70 (1997). See generally Moore v. 
Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923) (applying the same standard of review in habeas corpus to state 
court decisions of mixed question of law and fact and of questions of law).
200. Postelle v. Royal, No. CIV-12-1110-F, 2016 WL 4597629, at *5 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 2, 
2016) (alteration in original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Harrington, 562 U.S. at 102), aff’d sub 
nom. Postelle v. Carpenter, 901 F.3d 1202 (10th Cir. 2018).
201. 506 F.3d 358 (4th Cir. 2007).
202. Id. at 375.
203. Id. (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 n.12 (1978)).
204. Id. at 375–76.
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Similarly, in a pre-AEDPA case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit in Brogdon v. Blackburn205 reasoned that a codefendant’s 
life sentence was not relevant to the defendant’s “character, prior record, 
or the circumstances of his offense.”206 The Brogdon court did note, 
however, that the codefendant’s life sentence was relevant to an analysis 
of the proportionality of the defendant’s sentence compared to the 
sentences of others, an analysis required by state statute in Louisiana.207
Following the Fifth Circuit precedent, the U.S. District Court for the 
Western District of Texas in Cordova v. Johnson208 also concluded that a 
codefendant’s life sentence was not “constitutionally relevant mitigating
evidence” because it did not relate to the defendant’s “character or 
background or the circumstances of the crime.”209 The court, however, 
laid out a questionable restrained view of mitigating evidence, limiting it 
to “evidence that establishes (1) the defendant suffered from a uniquely 
severe permanent handicap with which the defendant is burdened through 
no fault of his own and (2) the defendant’s criminal act was attributable
to this severe permanent condition.”210 Considering a codefendant’s 
sentence, the court reasoned that “[t]he happenstance that a different 
sentencing authority, or . . . a different prosecutor, chose to display mercy 
toward [a codefendant] based on the peculiarities of [the codefendant’s] 
own character, background, record, and role in the offense, bears no 
relevance to the propriety of the petitioner’s sentence.”211
Recently, the District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma 
reported in Postelle v. Royal212 that most federal cases “indicate that a 
trial court does not violate Lockett or any other clearly established federal 
law by excluding evidence of a co-defendant’s sentence.”213 Thus, 
                                                                                                                     
205. 790 F.2d 1164 (5th Cir. 1986).
206. Id. at 1169 (quoting Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604 n.7).
207. Id.
208. 993 F. Supp. 473 (W.D. Tex. 1998).
209. Id. at 502–03.
210. Id. at 502.
211. Id.; see also McGehee v. Norris, No. 5:03-CV-143JMM, 2008 WL 11450875, at *1
(E.D. Ark. Feb. 28, 2008) (concluding that evidence of a codefendant’s lesser sentence was not a 
mitigating factor because it did not go toward the defendant’s character or culpability).
212. Postelle v. Royal, No. CIV-12-1110-F, 2016 WL 4597629 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 2, 2016),
aff’d sub nom. Postelle v. Carpenter, 901 F.3d 1202 (10th Cir. 2018). 
213. Id. at *19. In Postelle, the district court noted that it could not find any published Tenth 
Circuit decisions on the issue of whether Lockett requires admission of a codefendant’s sentence, 
although decisions from the Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits found that Lockett does not require 
admission of such evidence. Id. The Postelle court reasoned that the decisions from those circuits 
were consistent with Lockett’s definition of mitigation regarding a defendant’s character or record 
or the circumstances of the crime because a codefendant’s sentence “is an extrinsic 
consideration.” Id. Ultimately, applying the deferential habeas corpus standard of review, the 
Postelle court found that the state court did not err by excluding evidence of the codefendant’s
31
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applying AEDPA’s deferential standard of review, the district court 
found that the state court’s decision to preclude such evidence “was not 
contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal 
law.”214 Affirming that decision on appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Tenth Circuit recognized that “a legitimate controversy regarding the 
relevance of a codefendant’s sentence . . . indicates the Lockett line of 
cases does not answer the question.”215 But, like the lower court, the court 
of appeals upheld the state court’s exclusion of the mitigating factor 
under the federal habeas corpus deferential standard of review.216
Although recent federal court decisions provide limited insight into 
the issue because of the habeas standard of review,217 several state courts 
have concluded, on the merits, that the U.S. Constitution does not require 
a court to permit a jury to consider a codefendant’s sentence as mitigating 
evidence.218 For example, in the California case of People v. Dyer,219 the 
defendant wanted to introduce, during his penalty phase, evidence of the 
                                                                                                                     
sentence because it was “not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established 
federal law.” Id.
214. Id. The district court explained, “This conclusion is consistent with Lockett’s direction 
to allow mitigating evidence about a defendant’s character, record, or the circumstances of the 
crime. A co-defendant’s sentence does not fall into any of those categories. Instead, it is an 
extrinsic consideration.” Id.
215. Carpenter, 901 F.3d at 1223.
216. Id.
217. Additionally, the constitutional issue does not arise in federal death penalty trials 
because the federal death penalty statute expressly allows the mitigating circumstance. See 18 
U.S.C. § 3592 (a)(4) (2012) (requiring the jury to consider as a mitigating factor that “[a]nother 
defendant or defendants, equally culpable in the crime, will not be punished by death”).
218. See, e.g., Simpson v. State, 6 S.W.3d 104, 108–09 (Ark. 1999); Crowder v. State, 491 
S.E.2d 323, 325 (Ga. 1997) (“[W]e are not persuaded at this time that a certified copy of a co-
defendant’s life sentence is a mitigating circumstance for the jury to consider.”); Edwards v. State, 
200 S.W.3d 500, 510–11 (Mo. 2006) (en banc) (holding that appellate counsel was not ineffective 
for arguing a codefendant’s life sentence was mitigating evidence because case law indicated the 
defendant did not have a constitutional right to present such evidence); Commonwealth v. 
Williams, 896 A.2d 523, 547 (Pa. 2006) (holding that a codefendant’s sentence does not fall into 
the state’s definition of mitigating evidence); State v. Charping, 508 S.E.2d 851, 855 (S.C. 1998) 
(holding that a codefendant’s life sentence was not relevant to the circumstances of the crime and 
therefore the court was not required to admit the evidence as mitigating); Joubert v. State, 235 
S.W.3d 729, 734 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (holding that evidence related to a codefendant’s 
punishment is not a mitigating circumstance that a defendant has a constitutional right to present). 
Some of these states, however, do allow consideration of a codefendant’s sentence during 
proportionality review. See, e.g., State v. Gilmore, 681 S.W.2d 934, 946–47 (Mo. 1984) (en banc)
(considering a codefendant’s sentence during proportionality review); Commonwealth v. Zook, 
615 A.2d 1, 18 (Pa. 1992) (noting that information about codefendants is to be considered for 
proportionality review); Sheppard v. Commonwealth, 464 S.E.2d 131, 138 (Va. 1995) (holding 
that the court was not required to compare a defendant’s sentence to a codefendant’s sentence as 
part of proportionality review).
219. 753 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1988) (en banc).
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non-death sentences imposed in separate trials of two other participants 
in the murder.220 After the trial court ruled that such evidence was 
irrelevant, the Supreme Court of California agreed.221
The Dyer court noted U.S. Supreme Court precedent that 
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the 
sentencer, in all but the rarest kind of capital case, not be 
precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any 
aspect of a defendant’s character or record and any of the 
circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a 
basis for a sentence less than death.222
The court reasoned that the codefendant evidence did not relate to these 
aspects of the defendant or to the circumstances of the offense.223
Additionally, the court explained that the jury would not know the 
evidence submitted in the other cases because they had separate trials: 
“Such evidence provides nothing more than incomplete, extraneous, and 
confusing information to a jury . . . .”224
California courts have continued to follow Dyer’s reasoning.225 In the 
2011 case of People v. Moore,226 the Supreme Court of California noted 
that other jurisdictions held to the contrary but reasserted, “We have 
consistently held that evidence concerning coparticipants’ sentences is 
properly excluded from the penalty phase of a capital trial because such 
evidence is irrelevant.”227
                                                                                                                     
220. Id. at 26.
221. Id. at 26–27.
222. Id. (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978)). Similarly, the court noted that 
under California law mitigating evidence includes evidence of a defendant’s characteristics, such 
as background and mental condition. Id. at 26.
223. Id. at 27. Additionally, the court rejected the defendant’s “fairness” argument and 
declined to adopt a proportionality review that would take into account the other defendants’ 
sentences. Id. at 27–28.
224. Id. at 27. The court’s conclusion that a jury would not be familiar with the evidence 
submitted in a codefendant’s case is at odds with the practice of other courts; jurisdictions that 
allow sentencing juries to consider a codefendant’s sentence allow those juries to compare the 
mitigating and aggravating factors in the defendant’s case to the mitigating and aggravating 
factors in the codefendant’s case. This would not be possible if the sentencing jury did not know 
what evidence the codefendant’s jury had considered. See, e.g., State v. Bearup, 211 P.3d 684,
691 (Ariz. 2009).
225. See, e.g., People v. Salazar, 371 P.3d 161, 190 (Cal. 2016) (stating that evidence about 
what a different jury found regarding a different defendant “provides nothing more than 
incomplete, extraneous, and confusing information to a jury, which is then left to speculate”
(quoting People v. Benmore, 996 P.2d 1152 (Cal. 2000))).
226. 253 P.3d 1153 (Cal. 2011).
227. Id. at 1181 (citing People v. Brown, 73 P.3d 1137 (Cal. 2003)); People v. McDermott, 
51 P.3d 874, 912 (Cal. 2002); People v. Beardslee, 806 P.2d 1311, 1335 (Cal. 1991); People v. 
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A number of state courts have come to the same conclusion. For 
example, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has concluded that a 
codefendant’s punishment is not a mitigating factor because such 
punishments relate “neither to appellant’s character, nor to his record, nor 
to the circumstances of the offense.”228 The Oklahoma Court of Criminal 
Appeals similarly concluded that a codefendant’s sentence is not a 
mitigating factor because it “has no bearing on the defendant’s character
or record and is not a circumstance of the offense.”229
In jurisdictions that perform some sort of proportionality review, 
courts have reasoned that evidence about a codefendant’s sentence is 
better considered by appellate courts for that type of review rather than 
by juries as a mitigating circumstance.230 In Edwards v. State,231 the 
Missouri Supreme Court concluded that the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
decision in Parker v. Dugger on proportionality review does not mandate 
that a codefendant’s sentence be admitted as mitigating evidence.232
                                                                                                                     
Johnson, 767 P.2d 1047, 1075–76 (Cal. 1989), overruled by People v. Gutierrez, 395 P.3d 186
(Cal. 2017). The court recognized that 18 U.S.C. § 3592(a)(4) provides for the contrary and also 
that Florida courts held to the contrary. Moore, 253 P.3d at 1181.
228. Joubert v. State, 235 S.W.3d 729, 735 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (quoting Morris v. State, 
940 S.W.2d 610, 613 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)); see also State v. Williams, 292 S.E.2d 243, 261–
62 (N.C. 1982) (“[An accomplice’s] punishment is not an aspect of the defendant’s character or 
record nor a mitigating circumstance of the particular offense.”); State v. Hughes, 521 S.E.2d 500,
505 (S.C. 1999) (holding that a codefendant’s sentence is not a mitigating circumstance because 
it is not relevant to the defendant’s character, the defendant’s record, or the circumstances of the 
offense); Saldano v. State, 232 S.W.3d 77, 100 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (finding that evidence of 
a codefendant’s punishment is not mitigating evidence that a defendant has a constitutional right 
to present because such evidence does not relate to the defendant’s own circumstances); Morris,
940 S.W.2d at 614 (“We do not see how the conviction and punishment of a co-defendant could 
mitigate appellant’s culpability in the crime.” (quoting Evans v. State, 656 S.W.2d 65, 67 (Tex. 
Crim. App. 1983))). Texas also does not perform comparative proportionality review, so its courts 
do not consider a codefendant’s sentence at either stage. See McFarland v. State, 928 S.W.2d 482, 
499 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996), abrogated by Mosley v. State, 983 S.W.2d 249 (Tex. Crim. App. 
1988).
229. Wackerly v. State, 12 P.3d 1, 15 (Okla. Crim. App. 2000) (quoting Brogie v. State, 695 
P.2d 538, 547 (Okla. Crim. App. 1985)). Also, in Postelle v. State, 267 P.3d 114 (Okla. Crim. 
App. 2011), the court held that the trial court was correct in finding that the accomplice’s sentence 
was not relevant and that the defendant was the more culpable party. Id. at 140–42. The court 
reasoned that relevant mitigating evidence includes only evidence that relates to the defendant’s 
personal circumstances or blameworthiness. Id.
230. But then, in states without such proportionality review, such evidence would never 
otherwise be considered by the court. See supra Part IV.B.
231. 200 S.W.3d 500 (Mo. 2006) (en banc).
232. Id. at 510 (citing Parker v. Dugger, 498 U.S. 308 (1991)); see also Edwards v. Roper, 
No. 4:06-CV-1419 (CEJ), 2009 WL 3164112, at *14 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 28, 2009) (finding, on
habeas review, that the decision of the Missouri Supreme Court was not contrary to or an 
unreasonable application of Parker v. Dugger); cf. State v. McIlvoy, 629 S.W.2d 333, 341–42
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Similarly, in State v. Schneider,233 the Missouri Supreme Court stressed 
that a request to submit a codefendant’s sentence as mitigating is actually 
a request for a jury to conduct a proportionality review.234 The court 
explained that the argument to consider such evidence as mitigating “is 
flawed by its assumption that the jury may properly engage in a 
proportionality review which takes into consideration sentences awarded 
other defendants.”235 And the court concluded that such a task is assigned 
by statute to the Missouri Supreme Court, not the jury.236
Similarly, the Mississippi Supreme Court has stressed that 
proportionality review by an appellate court is the proper method for 
considering a codefendant’s sentence.237 Therefore, in Mississippi, which 
does have statutorily required proportionality review, the Mississippi 
Supreme Court has considered codefendants’ sentences as a part of 
proportionality review.238 Further, according to that court, the same 
evidence is not mitigation to be considered by sentencing jurors because 
such evidence does not relate to a defendant’s character, prior record, or 
circumstances of the offense.239
Another court found a different way to admit such evidence. In State 
v. Roseboro,240 the Supreme Court of North Carolina asserted that 
evidence of a codefendant’s sentence is not a mitigating circumstance 
under Supreme Court precedent because such evidence is “not relevant 
to a defendant’s character or record or to the circumstances of the 
killing.”241 But the court concluded that the evidence could still be 
                                                                                                                     
(Mo. 1982) (en banc) (finding a death sentence disproportionate to the crime because the 
defendant was a follower of a codefendant who had received a life sentence).
233. 736 S.W.2d 392 (Mo. 1987) (en banc).
234. Id. at 397.
235. Id.
236. Id.; see also McIlvoy, 629 S.W.2d at 341–42 (finding a death sentence disproportionate 
to the crime because the defendant was a follower of a codefendant who had received a life 
sentence).
237. See Stewart v. State, 662 So. 2d 552, 563 (Miss. 1995); Johnson v. State, 477 So. 2d 
196, 218 (Miss. 1985).
238. See, e.g., Pitchford v. State, 45 So. 3d 216, 259–60 (Miss. 2010) (holding that a 
defendant’s death sentence was not disproportional or excessive compared to a sixteen-year-old 
accomplice’s lesser sentence in light of the circumstances of the crime); Jordan v. State, 918 So. 
2d 636, 658–59 (Miss. 2005) (holding that the defendant’s death sentence was not 
disproportionate when compared to other death penalty cases or when compared to his 
codefendant’s sentence); Branch v. State, 882 So. 2d 36, 67 (Miss. 2004) (holding that a death 
sentence was not excessive or disproportionate to a codefendant’s life sentence); Smith v. State, 
877 So. 2d 369, 386–87 (Miss. 2004) (holding that a defendant’s death sentence was not 
disproportionate to a codefendant’s lesser sentence due to the defendant’s role in the crime and 
his criminal history).
239. See Stewart, 662 So. 2d at 562.
240. 528 S.E.2d 1 (N.C. 2000).
241. Id. at 8.
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considered as mitigating evidence under the state’s “catchall” mitigating 
circumstance provision in the state’s statute: “Any other circumstance 
arising from the evidence which the jury deems to have mitigating 
value.”242 Thus, the court found that such evidence meets the statutory
definition of “mitigating circumstances” but not the constitutional 
definition, although it was unclear why and how the two differed.243 In 
an unusual aspect of the case, the prosecution was the party raising the 
evidence, and the court held that it was proper for the prosecution to 
address the codefendant’s sentence while arguing in opposition to the 
“catchall” mitigating circumstance.244
Finally, although most cases involving a codefendant’s sentence 
feature a defendant wanting to use a codefendant’s prison sentence, in 
Commonwealth v. Lesko245 the defendant sought to introduce mitigating 
evidence that his codefendant was sentenced to death.246 The defendant 
claimed that the codefendant’s death sentence supported the argument 
that the codefendant was more culpable than the non-triggerman 
defendant.247 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, however, stated that the 
codefendant’s sentence was irrelevant to the jury’s task to weigh the 
circumstances related to the defendant.248
                                                                                                                     
242. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(f)(9) (2018); see Roseboro, 528 S.E.2d at 8.
243. One might argue that the Roseboro court is splitting hairs to say that evidence of a 
codefendant’s sentence is not “mitigating” under a constitutional definition while it is 
“mitigating” in the way the general term is used in the statute. Subsequent cases in the state have 
further distinguished the statutory “catchall” provision from the constitutional definition by 
stating that the use of such evidence under the “catchall” provision limits it to cases “where 
evidence of the co-defendant’s sentence is already before the court, such as where the co-
defendant testified at trial and evidence of a plea bargain was presented by way of impeachment.” 
State v. Roache, 595 S.E.2d 381, 426 (N.C. 2004) (citing State v. Gregory, 459 S.E.2d 638, 667 
(N.C. 1995)). In the Roache case, however, the court held that the defendant had waived the 
mitigating factor argument on appeal. Id. at 426.
244. Roseboro, 528 S.E.2d at 8. 
245. 15 A.3d 345 (Pa. 2011).
246. Id. at 398–99.
247. Id. at 398.
248. Id. at 399. Note, however, that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s statement about the 
evidence was dicta in the post-conviction appeal because the court first found that the claim had 
been waived. Id. at 398–99; see also Commonwealth v. Romero, 938 A.2d 362, 389–90 (Pa. 2007) 
(“[E]ven the ‘catch-all’ mitigating circumstance would not encompass evidence of co-
conspirators’ sentences because such evidence has nothing to do with ‘the character and record of 
the defendant’ or ‘the circumstances of his offense.’” (quoting Commonwealth v. Lopez, 854 
A.2d 465, 470–71 (Pa. 2004))); Commonwealth v. Williams, 896 A.2d 523, 547 (Pa. 2006) 
(rejecting the argument that codefendants’ criminal cases are relevant to mitigation for a
defendant); Commonwealth v. Haag, 562 A.2d 289, 298 (Pa. 1989) (stating that the outcome of 
the cases against the codefendants had “no bearing” on the defendant’s sentence); Commonwealth
v. Frey, 554 A.2d 27, 33 (Pa. 1989) (“Sentencing is a highly individualized matter, and we have 
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Jurisdictions that do not require courts to allow juries to consider 
evidence regarding an accomplice’s sentence create a division across the 
country. Some jurisdictions allow the mitigating factor, some do not, and 
some conclude that the evidence is relevant as a part of appellate 
proportionality review.
IV. WHY CAPITAL DEFENDANTS SHOULD HAVE A CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHT TO INTRODUCE A CODEFENDANT’S SENTENCE AS A
MITIGATING FACTOR
Although courts around the country are divided on the issue, the courts 
that hold that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments requires trial courts 
to allow juries to consider a codefendant’s sentence as mitigating are 
correct for several reasons.249 First and foremost, the Supreme Court’s 
broad treatment of mitigating factors, stressing the importance of 
individualized sentencing, dictates that juries be able to consider this 
mitigating factor. 
Second, such a mitigating factor also is supported by the Supreme 
Court’s discussion about the importance of proportionality and fairness. 
Third, the Supreme Court’s emphasis on the policies supporting the 
constitutionality of the death penalty are served by this mitigating factor. 
Finally, courts that have denied defendants the right to submit a 
codefendant’s sentence as mitigating evidence have read the Supreme 
Court cases too narrowly.
A. A Codefendant’s Sentence Reflects on Both the Circumstances of the 
Crime and the Character of the Defendant
The main point of contention between the jurisdictions that allow the 
admission of a codefendant’s sentence as mitigating evidence and those 
that do not is the question of whether such evidence fits within the 
description of mitigating circumstances laid out by the U.S. Supreme 
Court. One argument against a constitutional requirement that a sentencer 
consider a codefendant’s sentence is that the Court has defined mitigating 
factors as ones that reflect the “circumstances of the crime or the 
character of the defendant.”250 One might argue, as some courts have 
reasoned, that the sentence of another person has nothing to do with the 
character of the defendant or the circumstances of the crime. Therefore, 
they explain, such evidence does not help achieve the Constitution’s goal 
of an individualized sentence for a capital defendant. 
                                                                                                                     
already ruled that the cases against [the codefendants] are not similar to [the defendant’s] case for 
purposes of proportionality review.”).
249. Even without clarity on the constitutional issue, it would be good policy for states to 
adopt this mitigating circumstance as a statutory factor for many of the reasons stated in this 
Article.
250. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 198 (1976).
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Thus, one argument against allowing a jury to consider the sentence 
of a codefendant is that such information is about the codefendant and 
does not really say anything about the character of the defendant. 
Additionally, one might argue that the codefendant’s jury may have 
determined that the defendant was more culpable and thus sentenced the 
codefendant to a lesser sentence.
In reality, however, evaluating the sentence of a codefendant does 
help the defendant’s jury evaluate both the character of the defendant and 
the circumstances of the crime, especially the latter. The extent of the 
codefendant’s involvement and the appropriate punishment for that 
codefendant arguably convey information about the character of the 
defendant. How the two codefendants interacted and the relative 
culpability, as assessed by another jury, provide details about the 
defendant. 
Even more so than demonstrating character, though, a codefendant’s 
sentence provides the jury with information about the circumstances of 
the crime. If another jury has determined that a perpetrator of the exact 
same crime deserves a sentence less than death, then the defendant’s jury 
should weigh what that decision says about the circumstances of the 
crime. Such information may mean more to a jury and tell a jury more 
about the crime than a defendant’s adjustment to incarceration, which the 
Supreme Court found to be a mitigating circumstance in Skipper v. South 
Carolina.251
Additionally, Congress has indicated that it considers evidence of a 
codefendant’s sentence as evidence fitting within a “defendant’s 
background, record, or character or any other circumstance of the 
offense.”252 The sentencing statute for the federal death penalty states: 
“In determining whether a sentence of death is to be imposed on a 
defendant, the finder of fact shall consider any mitigating factor, 
including the following: . . . Another defendant or defendants, equally 
culpable in the crime, will not be punished by death.”253 The statute’s 
language includes a codefendant’s sentence as a “mitigating factor,”254
supporting reasoning that the factor fits within the constitutional 
definition. 
Of course, a statute may provide more mitigating factors than are 
required by the Constitution. But the federal statute goes on to also 
include a catchall provision: “Other factors in the defendant’s 
                                                                                                                     
251. 476 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1986). 
252. 18 U.S.C. § 3592(a)(8) (2012).
253. Id. § 3592(a)(4).
254. The six other specifically listed mitigating factors in addition to the sentences of equally 
culpable codefendants include impaired capacity, duress, minor participation, no prior criminal 
record, disturbance, and victim’s consent. Id. § 3592(a).
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background, record, or character or any other circumstance of the offense 
that mitigate against imposition of the death sentence.”255 The catchall 
provision, therefore, incorporates the definition of mitigating evidence 
used by the Supreme Court’s constitutional analysis. And, importantly, 
the phrasing of the language of this catchall provision indicates that the 
specifically listed mitigating factors, including the codefendant’s 
sentence, also fall into the constitutional definition of other factors within 
“the defendant’s background, record, or character or any other 
circumstance of the offense that mitigate against imposition of the death 
sentence.”256 Although the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the U.S. 
Constitution is not bound by Congress’s interpretation of the same 
language, Congress’s assessment does provide guidance as a reasonable 
interpretation.
Most importantly, the Supreme Court has long used broad language 
to define mitigating evidence because the requirement for individualized 
sentencing when a defendant’s life is at stake is an important 
constitutional right. For example, in Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman,257 the 
Court further “emphasized the severity of imposing a death sentence and 
that ‘the sentencer in capital cases must be permitted to consider any
relevant mitigating factor.’”258 In Payne v. Tennessee,259 the Court noted 
that “virtually no limits are placed on the relevant mitigating evidence a 
capital defendant may introduce concerning his own circumstances.”260
Similarly, in Skipper, the Court explained that even though 
favorable inferences from [testimony about the 
defendant’s adjustment to incarceration] . . . would not 
relate specifically to [the defendant’s] culpability for the 
crime[,] . . . there is no question but that such inferences 
would be ‘mitigating’ in the sense that they might serve
‘as a basis for a sentence less than death.’261
The Court has noted that for a piece of mitigating evidence to be 
admitted, it need not be overwhelmingly persuasive for a life sentence, 
                                                                                                                     
255. Id. § 3592(a)(8).
256. Id.
257. 550 U.S. 233 (2007).
258. Id. at 248 (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 112 (1982)).
259. 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
260. Id. at 822–23 (addressing the admission of victim impact evidence by the prosecution);
see also Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 171 (2006) (stating that the Court has noted that “as a 
requirement of individualized sentencing, a jury must have the opportunity to consider all 
evidence relevant to mitigation”).
261. Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1986) (citation omitted) (quoting Lockett
v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978)).
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and jurors must be allowed to consider evidence that might be relevant. 
There is a “low threshold for relevance” regarding mitigating evidence in 
capital cases.262 “Relevant mitigating evidence is evidence which tends 
logically to prove or disprove some fact or circumstance which a fact-
finder could reasonably deem to have mitigating value.”263 A fact finder 
could reasonably determine that the fact that a codefendant received a life 
sentence tends to support the conclusion that a defendant should also be 
sentenced to something less than death.264
Although the Court has stated that in the context of mitigating 
circumstances, “the Eighth Amendment does not deprive the State of its 
authority to set reasonable limits upon the evidence a defendant can 
submit, and to control the manner in which it is submitted,”265 this
language reflects on how such evidence is considered. The Court’s 
limiting language on mitigating factors permits lower courts to limit how 
mitigating evidence is assessed. But the Court’s decisions otherwise have 
shown the Justices are reluctant to allow limits on what factors are 
actually mitigating.
                                                                                                                     
262. Smith v. Texas, 543 U.S. 37, 44 (2004) (quoting Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 285 
(2004)) (noting that there is a low relevance threshold for mitigating factors); Tennard, 542 U.S. 
at 284–85 (stating that the meaning of “relevance” is the same for mitigating evidence as in any 
other context).
263. McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 440 (1990) (quoting State v. McKoy, 372 
S.E.2d 12, 45 (N.C. 1988) (Exum, C.J., dissenting)); see also Tennard, 542 U.S. at 285 (“[A] State 
cannot bar ‘the consideration of . . . evidence if the sentencer could reasonably find that it warrants 
a sentence less than death.’” (alteration in original) (quoting McKoy, 494 U.S. at 441)). Note that 
in Tennard, the issue related to the relevance of the defendant’s evidence of a low I.Q., not 
whether the factor could be mitigating. Id. at 284.
264. By contrast, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma in Postelle v. 
Royal precluded evidence of a codefendant’s sentence by rejecting the petitioner’s argument that 
any evidence that gives some reason to impose a sentence less than death is constitutionally 
required mitigating evidence. Postelle v. Royal, No. CIV-12-1110-F, 2016 WL 4597629, at *19
(W.D. Okla. Sept. 2, 2016), aff’d sub nom. Postelle v. Carpenter, 901 F.3d 1202 (10th Cir. 2018). 
The court countered that it could think of a number of facts that might give “some reason” not to 
impose the death penalty, “[b]ut many of those facts would be completely irrelevant to the actual 
case that the jury must resolve.” Id. Similarly, in United States v. Gabrion, 719 F.3d 511 (6th Cir. 
2013), the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit contemplated that a broad reading of the Supreme 
Court’s language on mitigating factors “would compel admission of evidence regarding the 
positions of the planets and moons at the time of the defendant’s offense—so long as he can show 
that at least one juror is a firm believer in astrology.” Id. at 522. The argument in this Article, 
however, is not that anything that “might” give a reason for a lesser sentence is mitigating. Instead, 
there is a reasonableness element to the definition of mitigating evidence in that it must be 
something that a factfinder could reasonably determine has mitigating value. See McKoy, 494 
U.S. at 440.
265. Oregon v. Guzek, 546 U.S. 517, 526 (2006). The Court’s discussion in that case was 
about the power of a state to “structure and shape consideration of mitigating evidence.” Id.
(quoting Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 377 (1990)); see also Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 
350, 362 (1993). 
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Thus, in light of the Court’s language about the importance of 
mitigation as well as the low standard for relevance, logic dictates that a 
codefendant’s sentence fits within the definition of constitutionally 
required mitigating evidence. A number of case decisions, as well as 
Congress’s understanding of the constitutional requirement for mitigating
evidence, support this conclusion.
B. The Supreme Court’s Concerns About Fairness and Proportionality 
Support that a Codefendant’s Sentence Should Be a Mitigating Factor
As discussed above, the Supreme Court has long been concerned that 
the death penalty be applied fairly.266 While it has not mandated 
proportionality review, the Court has noted that such analysis might be 
an issue if cases with death sentences are not distinguished from cases 
with lesser sentences.267 This fairness and proportionality concern 
supports allowing juries to consider a codefendant’s sentence as a 
mitigating factor.268 In many situations, no case will be more comparable 
than the case of an accomplice to the same murder. 
Some jurisdictions, though, use the proportionality argument to argue 
against allowing codefendants’ sentences to be used as a mitigating 
factor. These courts conclude that the codefendant’s sentence is better 
weighed by an appellate court as part of proportionality review than by a 
jury during sentencing.269 They reason that the amount of evaluation 
required to compare different defendants is better done by an appellate 
court.
There is some appeal to the argument that the comparison of cases is 
complicated and better left to the appellate courts. But these cases in 
jurisdictions that require such proportionality review by state statute 
ignore that not all states require such a proportionality review. The 
mitigating circumstance question instead focuses on whether the Eighth 
Amendment requires all jurisdictions to allow defendants to present such 
evidence to juries. 
These courts that advocate for such evidence only to be evaluated by 
an appellate court still conclude that such evidence is important.270 But if 
                                                                                                                     
266. See supra Part I.
267. See supra text accompanying notes 60–96.
268. See State v. Getsy, 702 N.E.2d 866, 892 (Ohio 1998) (reasoning that the U.S. Supreme 
Court in Parker v. Dugger implied that a codefendant’s life sentence can be weighed as a 
nonstatutory mitigating circumstance). But see Edwards v. State, 200 S.W.3d 500, 510 (Mo. 2006)
(en banc) (concluding that Parker made no such conclusion about the use of a codefendant’s 
sentence under the U.S. Constitution).
269. See supra notes 102–05 and accompanying text.
270. The Supreme Court might consider a middle approach, holding that the Constitution 
requires such codefendant evidence to be weighed at least once. So such evidence would have to 
be considered as a mitigating circumstance or for proportionality review (by the trial judge, an 
41
Kirchmeier: Beyond Compare: A Codefendant's Prison Sentence as a Mitigating F
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository,
1058 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71
the Constitution does not require courts to admit evidence of a 
codefendant’s sentence as mitigation, then in some jurisdictions, courts 
may never consider the significance of a codefendant’s sentence before a 
defendant is executed.271
Additionally, the proportionality review done by appellate courts
differs from the weighing done by jurors. For proportionality review, an 
appellate court compares a defendant’s sentence against other cases to 
determine whether the defendant’s sentence is excessive or 
disproportionate in comparison to them.272 By contrast, at sentencing, 
generally, a jury weighs all of the mitigating evidence together against 
the aggravating factors.273 So, even in a case where an appellate court 
might conclude that a defendant’s death sentence is not excessive 
compared to other cases, a jury might see a codefendant’s lesser sentence 
as enough of a mitigating factor to tip the balance in favor of a life 
sentence. In this way, the issue of mitigation is separate from whether 
there is proportionality review. 
Furthermore, the mitigating factor would allow jurors to focus on 
comparing the defendant’s case to any accomplices and their role in the 
homicide. By contrast, proportionality review is a much broader 
examination of all similar cases. Thus, the codefendant mitigating factor 
works differently from appellate proportionality review while still 
serving the proportionality policy goals. 
C. Allowing a Codefendant’s Sentence as a Mitigating Factor Serves 
the Death Penalty Goals of Retribution and Deterrence
On several occasions, the Supreme Court has stressed the importance 
of the fact that capital punishment may serve the criminal justice policies 
of retribution and deterrence. Allowing juries to weigh disparate 
sentences among accomplices to the same murder will further serve those 
goals of the criminal justice system. 
In upholding the constitutionality of the death penalty in Gregg v. 
Georgia,274 the plurality reasoned that it was constitutionally significant 
that a state legislature may determine that death is an appropriate 
                                                                                                                     
appeals court, or both). While such a compromise would ignore the Court’s strong language 
regarding mitigating circumstances, it would help address the Court’s concerns about fairness in 
capital sentencing.
271. In such jurisdictions, not only is there no check on disparate sentences, but there is no
way to deter prosecutors from using conflicting theories in different trials involving codefendants.
See Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175, 182 (2005) (raising due process concerns about 
prosecutors using conflicting theories in related cases).
272. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
273. See supra Part II.
274. 428 U.S. 153, 184–86 (1976) (plurality opinion).
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punishment for murder because the punishment serves the goals of 
retribution and deterrence.275 The conclusion was important because the 
Eighth Amendment requires that a punishment not “be so totally without 
penological justification that it results in the gratuitous infliction of 
suffering.”276 Thus, the death penalty is only constitutional if a legislature 
may reasonably determine that the death penalty serves the goals of 
retribution and deterrence.
Capital punishment may serve the goals of retributive policy as “an
expression of society’s moral outrage at particularly offensive 
conduct.”277 Retributive policy also requires that a defendant’s sentence 
be proportionate to the crime.278 As noted above, in assessing 
proportionality, it is useful to consider how other similar defendants are 
treated. If equally culpable defendants are given different sentences, 
retributive goals are not served by the unequal treatment. And the system 
fails to serve the basic retributive goal of proportionality when two or 
more equally culpable defendants in the same case are treated differently. 
Because not all jurisdictions have appellate proportionality review, it is 
essential that jurors assess a codefendant’s sentence to ensure the death 
penalty serves basic retributive goals.
Similarly, for a punishment to be a deterrent to others, it must be 
applied in a fair and predictable manner.279 If a punishment appears 
random or unequal when equally culpable codefendants receive widely 
different sentences, its deterrent value will be lessened.280 Therefore, 
assuming capital punishment is more of a deterrent than a life sentence, 
that deterrent value is undermined if a potential murderer would not 
believe that an arbitrarily applied death penalty would be a possible 
punishment.
                                                                                                                     
275. Id. at 186–87 (“[T]he moral consensus concerning the death penalty and its social utility 
as a sanction, require us to conclude, in the absence of more convincing evidence, that the 
infliction of death as a punishment for murder is not without justification and thus is not 
unconstitutionally severe.”).
276. Id. at 182–83.
277. Id. at 183.
278. Id. at 187 (“Finally, we must consider whether the punishment of death is 
disproportionate in relation to the crime for which it is imposed.”). While the Gregg plurality 
spoke of proportionality in the relation between the punishment and the crime, as discussed 
earlier, in other cases the Court’s jurisprudence on proportionality has included a comparison of 
crimes and defendants.
279. See, e.g., Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors “Seek Justice”?, 26 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 607, 612–18 (1999) (explaining that prosecutors have special obligations, which allows them 
to “seek justice” through specific professional obligations).
280. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez, 184 F. Supp. 3d 1209, 1235–36 (D.N.M. 2016) 
(citations omitted) (discussing a range of literature on deterrence and concluding that “[s]tudies 
universally find that certainty of punishment has a far greater deterrent effect than severity of 
punishment”).
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Thus, to ensure that the death penalty serves the goal of deterrence, as 
well as retribution, equally culpable defendants—and especially 
codefendants for the same crime—should receive similar punishments. 
Or, at the least, a jury should consider and weigh the mitigating power of 
a codefendant’s sentence. The Supreme Court has repeatedly stressed the 
important role that juries play in capital sentencing.281 For jurors to be 
able to fully serve their role as the conscience of the community in 
ensuring that capital punishment serves its constitutional goals,282 they 
need information such as if an equally culpable codefendant received a 
sentence less than death.
D. A Constitutional Requirement for the Codefendant Mitigating 
Factor Will Not Overly Broaden the Definition of Mitigating Factors 
and Is Not Inconsistent with Oregon v. Guzek
Opponents of the use of evidence of a codefendant’s sentence may 
argue that allowing such evidence as mitigating will overly broaden what 
is defined as “mitigating.” Lower courts have rejected some factors that 
one may argue are similar to a codefendant’s sentence.283 For example, 
some defendants are prosecuted under federal law in states that do not 
have the death penalty.284 So some federal capital defendants have 
attempted to argue that the fact that the state does not have the death 
penalty should be a mitigating circumstance in federal court.285 And, as 
noted earlier, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit rejected the 
state’s lack of capital punishment as a mitigating factor.286
Still, a court should not preclude a codefendant’s sentence from being
mitigating out of fear that it might overly broaden the definition of 
                                                                                                                     
281. See, e.g., Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 n.15 (1968) (“[O]ne of the most 
important functions any jury can perform in making . . . a selection [between life imprisonment 
and death for a defendant convicted in a capital case] is to maintain a link between contemporary 
community values and the penal system—a link without which the determination of punishment 
would hardly reflect ‘the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing 
society.’” (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958))).
282. See, e.g., Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 615–16 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring) 
(stressing the importance of jury sentencing in death penalty cases to prevent arbitrariness).
283. See, e.g., Beardslee v. Woodford, 358 F.3d 560, 579 (9th Cir. 2004).
284. See, e.g., United States v. Gabrion, 719 F.3d 511, 522 (6th Cir. 2013).
285. See, e.g., id.
286. Id. (“That Michigan lacks a death penalty has nothing to do with . . . [the defendant’s] 
background or character.”). By contrast, the dissent argued that the evidence regarding the 
location of the crime does seem to fit within the Supreme Court’s definition of mitigating evidence 
as a “circumstance of the offense.” Id. at 540–41 (Moore, J., dissenting) (“A juror may have been 
less inclined to impose the death penalty for a crime committed in Michigan if he knew that the 
United States’s ability to prosecute the crime and impose a sentence of death was determined by 
a distance roughly the length of a hockey rink.”); see also supra note 143 and accompanying text
(discussing the location of the crime in Gabrion).
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possible mitigating factors. As noted earlier, the Supreme Court has 
repeatedly used broad language in defining “mitigating circumstances” 
in light of what a jury might “reasonably find . . . warrants a sentence less 
than death.”287 So, allowing such evidence would be consistent with the 
Court’s precedent and not broaden it.
Additionally, in arguing that a co-participant’s sentence is not 
constitutionally required as a mitigating factor, one might compare this 
potential mitigating factor to the “residual doubt” mitigating factor. One 
of the rare times the Supreme Court arguably limited what constitutes a 
mitigating factor is the Court’s treatment of the factor of “residual doubt,” 
sometimes called “lingering doubt.”288 In residual doubt cases, 
defendants have argued that during capital sentencing they should be able 
to try to persuade jurors not to impose a death sentence on the basis that
they are not completely sure that the defendant is guilty of the murder.289
Some Supreme Court language implies that there is no constitutional 
requirement to consider “residual doubt” as a mitigating circumstance.290
In Oregon v. Guzek,291 the Supreme Court found that the Constitution did 
not require that courts allow capital defendants to introduce new evidence 
at sentencing to support a mitigating argument of residual doubt about a
capital defendant's guilt.292 In Guzek, during the sentencing hearing, the 
defendant wished to introduce new alibi evidence from the defendant’s 
                                                                                                                     
287. Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 285 (2004) (quoting McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 
U.S. 433, 441 (1990)).
288. Jennifer R. Treadway, ‘Residual Doubt’ in Capital Sentencing: No Doubt It Is an 
Appropriate Mitigating Factor, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 215, 215–16 (1992).
289. Advocates of this mitigating circumstance argue that while a jury may convict someone 
of murder “beyond a reasonable doubt,” society should not execute a defendant unless a higher 
degree of guilt is established. See, e.g., id. (arguing residual doubt should be a mitigating factor);
see also Margery Malkin Koosed, Averting Mistaken Executions by Adopting the Model Penal 
Code’s Exclusion of Death in the Presence of Lingering Doubt, 21 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 41, 111–12
(2001) (arguing that requiring jurors to find guilt on a stronger standard than proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt before proceeding to a capital penalty phase would lower the risk of wrongful 
executions).
290. In Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164 (1988), the Court noted in dicta that a capital 
defendant may not have a constitutional right to an instruction telling the jury to consider a 
lingering doubt about the defendant's guilt as mitigating. Id. at 172–73. The Court reasoned that 
such doubts are not part of a defendant’s “‘character,’ ‘record,’ or a ‘circumstance of the offense.’”
Id. at 174. But because the jury instructions in the case did not completely prohibit such 
consideration, the Court did not resolve the issue. Id. at 175. Similarly, in Oregon v. Guzek, 546 
U.S. 517 (2006), in addressing the right to present residual doubt evidence as a mitigating factor, 
the Court clarified that it was not completely resolving the issue. Id. at 525.
291. 546 U.S. 517 (2006).
292. Id. at 526–27. Justice Scalia, however, wrote a concurring opinion joined by one other 
Justice saying he would reject that the Eighth Amendment allows residual-doubt claims during 
capital sentencing. Id. at 528 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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mother.293 Although Oregon law allowed a defendant to introduce any 
transcript evidence at the sentencing, the defendant argued he should also 
be allowed to introduce new testimony of innocence.294 The Supreme 
Court concluded that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments do not give 
a defendant the right to introduce new evidence to cast “residual doubt” 
on the defendant’s guilt.295
The Court framed much of its analysis around allowing the state to 
structure consideration of mitigating evidence rather than around 
prohibiting a mitigating factor, stressing that “[s]tates are free to structure 
and shape consideration of mitigating evidence ‘in an effort to achieve a 
more rational and equitable administration of the death penalty.’”296
Although the Court did not find a constitutional right that allowed the 
defendant in Guzek to introduce his new alibi evidence, the Court based 
its reasoning on three aspects of the case.297 First, the Court emphasized 
that sentencing generally does not focus on questions of guilt.298 Second, 
the Court noted that the residual doubt evidence addressed an issue that 
was already addressed, that is, guilt.299 Third, the Court noted that 
defendants in Oregon are not harmed by a prohibition on new residual 
doubt evidence at sentencing because Oregon law allows defendants to 
present to the sentencing jury the evidence of innocence from the original 
trial.300 Thus, because Oregon still allowed innocence evidence from trial 
to be argued at sentencing, the Court’s decision did not resolve the issue 
of whether the Constitution ever requires courts to allow residual doubt 
as a mitigating factor.301
Some lower courts have gone further to hold that once guilt is 
established beyond a reasonable doubt, the Constitution does not require 
that a defendant be allowed to argue the mitigating circumstance of 
residual doubt.302 Similarly, in Holland v. Anderson,303 the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that a Mississippi capital defendant 
                                                                                                                     
293. Id. at 520.
294. Id. at 526–27 (quoting OR. REV. STAT. § 138.012(2)(b) (2003)).
295. Id. at 527. 
296. Id. at 526 (quoting Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 377 (1990)).
297. Id. at 526–27.
298. Id. at 526.
299. Id.
300. Id. at 526–27.
301. Id. at 525. The Guzek Court noted that “we once again face a situation where we need 
not resolve whether such a right exists, for, even if it does, it could not extend so far as to provide 
this defendant with a right to introduce the evidence at issue.” Id.
302. See, e.g., Homick v. State, 825 P.2d 600, 609–10 (Nev. 1992) (affirming a death 
sentence and holding that the trial court did not err in refusing the defendant’s requested jury 
instruction listing residual doubt as a mitigating circumstance because there is no constitutional 
mandate); see also McKenna v. State, 968 P.2d 739, 749 (Nev. 1998) (same). 
303. 583 F.3d 267 (5th Cir. 2009).
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could not introduce new testimony from a pathologist at sentencing to 
rebut guilt evidence from the trial.304
If one were to read Guzek broadly,305 one might argue that Guzek
limits Lockett and Eddings and justifies allowing states similarly to 
preclude codefendant evidence from a sentencing hearing. Arguably, 
residual doubt is more relevant to a defendant’s character than a 
codefendant’s sentence is, so if the Supreme Court allows the exclusion 
of residual doubt evidence, then excluding evidence of a codefendant’s 
sentence would not violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
The reasoning of Guzek, however, does not support a conclusion that 
a state may preclude evidence of a co-participant’s life sentence. The 
Court’s conclusion in Guzek was based on the reasoning that guilt 
evidence is litigated at trial, and thus jurors already have access to that 
information.306 In allowing states to preclude new evidence of innocence, 
the Court reasoned that the harm to a defendant was minimal because of 
the other opportunities to present evidence of innocence.307
By contrast, a capital defendant’s sentencing hearing may be the only 
opportunity where a defendant can present evidence about a 
codefendant’s sentence. Generally, the evidence will not already be 
presented to a jury.308 Thus, the reasoning of Guzek, the rare case where 
the Supreme Court rejected a mitigating factor, does not apply to support 
banning evidence of a codefendant’s sentence as a mitigating factor. The 
harm to a defendant is not minimal when a jury is not allowed to consider 
and weigh the mitigating power of evidence of a co-participant’s 
sentence.
E. It Is Not Impractical to Permit the Co-Participant Mitigating Factor
Another argument against allowing a co-participant’s sentence as a
mitigating factor is that such evidence has the potential to complicate the 
defendant’s sentencing hearing. If a court provides a capital sentencing 
jury with information that a co-participant received a life sentence, the 
                                                                                                                     
304. Id. at 280. Unlike Oregon, Mississippi did not have a statute that allowed the admission 
of evidence of innocence from trial. Id. at 278. Still, the Holland court concluded that under 
Guzek, a defendant “does not have the right to present evidence at resentencing that is inconsistent 
with the verdict of the guilt-phase jury.” Id. at 280.
305. In contrast to Holland, one might reason that Guzek is a narrow decision, limited to the 
situation in the case. There, the Court allowed a state to prohibit new evidence of innocence during 
a sentencing hearing in a situation where the state already allowed the sentencing jury to consider 
evidence of innocence submitted during the guilt trial. Guzek, 546 U.S. at 526–27. Thus, on the 
facts and reasoning of the case, Guzek is a narrow holding, limited to where the jury knew of some
evidence of innocence already. See id. at 526–27.
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. One rare exception would be where all of the defendants are tried and sentenced 
together.
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issue arises whether or not the jury would also have to evaluate 
differences between the co-participant and the defendant to evaluate 
whether there are differences that justify the different sentences. 
Courts may deal with this issue in a number of ways. One approach 
would be to simplify the process. A jury could be presented with the fact 
that a codefendant received a life sentence, and a judge may merely 
instruct the jurors that they should recognize that each defendant is an 
individual with individual circumstances, but the jury may consider the 
sentence as mitigating if the jury wishes to do so. 
Another approach is to allow parties to argue the differences once a 
defendant presents a codefendant’s sentence as mitigating. In most cases, 
the debate would not be complicated. Prosecutors could explain that a 
disparity is justified because a codefendant was less responsible for the 
murder due to different actions or different mental capabilities due to 
mental illness or age. Prosecutors could also point out that a codefendant 
had other mitigating factors that would justify a different sentence. And 
a defense attorney could respond to the arguments. In fact, Arizona courts
have been able to use a system that allows juries to consider a 
codefendant’s sentence when there is an “unexplained disparity” between 
the sentences of the codefendant and the defendant on trial.309
Often, much of the evidence about a codefendant’s role in a crime 
would already be presented at the guilt phase to show the facts of the 
crime. And, while one may argue that these arguments add other factors 
to the sentencing process, it would not be a bad thing. Furthermore, the 
Court already permits evidence that can similarly complicate a sentencing 
hearing, such as a prosecutor’s introduction of victim impact evidence.310
Considering the Eighth Amendment goals of eliminating arbitrariness 
and instilling some thoughtful process in sentencing, it would be useful 
to have the jury consider mitigation in concrete terms, comparing 
defendants and evaluating how to balance different factors in determining 
whether a defendant should live or die. Thus, any “complications” added 
by allowing introduction of a mitigating circumstance would in fact make 
sentencing more thoughtful and less arbitrary.
More importantly, every mitigating factor adds further complications 
to the sentencing process. Facts about a defendant’s background often 
result in the addition of a minitrial. So even if the mitigating factor of a 
codefendant’s sentence adds more evidence for the jury to evaluate, that 
fact does not justify eliminating the mitigating factor, especially when the 
factor helps make the process more concrete and less arbitrary.
                                                                                                                     
309. State v. Bearup, 211 P.3d 684, 695 (Ariz. 2009) (en banc) (quoting State v. Ellison, 140 
P.3d 899, 923 (Ariz. 2006)).
310. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 822–23 (1991) (holding that the Constitution does 
not prohibit the prosecution from introducing evidence about the victim during sentencing if state 
law allows it).
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A final response to concerns about complicating the process is that 
there is proof that the sentencing system can work with the use of 
evidence of a codefendant’s sentence. Jurisdictions that already allow the 
mitigating factor are able to allow the evidence without overburdening 
the system. While two states that often consider this factor—Arizona and 
Florida—have in the past had greater involvement of judges in capital 
sentencing than many other states,311 there is no reason that jurors are not 
able to effectively balance this mitigating factor, and jurors have done so 
in practice.
There are some additional arguments one may make to support the 
conclusion that courts should not be required to permit the introduction 
of a codefendant’s sentence as mitigation. For example, one might argue 
that if such evidence may be submitted by a defendant, then a prosecutor 
should be able to introduce evidence that a codefendant was sentenced to 
death. Such an argument neglects the constitutional mandate surrounding 
mitigating evidence. Under Lockett and other cases, the Eighth 
Amendment gives a defendant the right to introduce mitigating 
evidence.312 There is no similar constitutional right for prosecutors to 
submit anything that is aggravating. Thus, the constitutional requirement 
applies only to a defendant’s introduction of mitigating evidence. 
An additional argument against the requirement for such mitigating 
evidence is that in a case of two codefendants tried separately, the 
defendant tried first would not be able to use as mitigating the fact that 
the defendant tried second received a life sentence. Therefore, the 
argument goes, whether one may get the benefit of this mitigating factor 
may arbitrarily depend on which defendant is tried first. 
Jurisdictions with proportionality review have also addressed the 
timing issue in that context, allowing whatever evidence is available at 
the time of review. In Griffin v. State,313 the Florida Supreme Court 
explained that 
“[e]ven when a codefendant has been sentenced subsequent 
to the sentencing of the defendant seeking review on direct 
appeal, it is proper for this Court to consider the propriety of 
the disparate sentences in order to determine whether a death 
                                                                                                                     
311. Until relatively recently, Arizona had judges do the sentencing in capital cases, while 
judges in Florida impose sentences after juries recommend the appropriate sentence. See, e.g.,
Maria T. Kolar, “Finding” a Way to Complete the Ring of Capital Jury Sentencing, 95 DENV. L.
REV. 671, 681, 683 (2018).
312. See, e.g., Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 608 (1978).
313. 114 So. 3d 890 (Fla. 2013).
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sentence is appropriate given the conduct of all participants 
in committing the crime.”314
More importantly, the possibility of such a timing situation is not a 
reason to deny a defendant the constitutional right to submit any available 
mitigating evidence. The Supreme Court has acknowledged that 
mitigating evidence may develop after a defendant is sentenced to death, 
and that such a development does not create a constitutional problem.315
Thus, it would not create a constitutional problem if one defendant were 
not able to use such evidence and another one were. Further, even 
assuming there is some level of nonconstitutional unfairness, such a 
possibility does not undermine the other reasons the Constitution 
demands that a defendant be able to submit such evidence. Additionally, 
a defendant who was tried first and sentenced to death would be able to 
use a co-participant’s later life sentence for arguments during clemency 
proceedings, retrials, and resentencing hearings.316
Some may argue that it is unfair to consider a codefendant’s life 
sentence as mitigating when the codefendants may have been less 
culpable. But a jury could still consider those facts. The issue is not how 
mitigating a codefendant’s sentence should be, but whether it should be 
mitigating at all. The answer to the latter question is that a jury should be 
able to consider a co-participant’s non-death sentence as mitigating, and 
from there the jury may consider how mitigating it should be.
Finally, one problem remains even if the Supreme Court concludes 
that the Constitution requires jurors to consider a co-participant’s 
sentence as a mitigating factor. Each juror brings their own beliefs to the 
jury room, so that how much weight a mitigating factor receives may vary 
drastically from juror to juror. One study by the Capital Juror Project 
found that jurors generally give different weight to different mitigating 
factors.317 The study found that only about a fifth of jurors would give 
                                                                                                                     
314. Id. at 910 (alteration in original) (quoting Scott v. Dugger, 604 So. 2d 465, 468 (Fla. 
1992)).
315. See Evans v. Virginia, 471 U.S. 1025, 1028–29 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting). While 
the development of new mitigating evidence after sentencing may not justify a new sentencing 
hearing on its own, such evidence would be admitted if a new sentencing hearing were granted 
on other grounds. Id. Wilbert Evans was sentenced to death based on the aggravating factor of 
future dangerousness and was eventually executed. Id. While on death row, he had saved the lives 
of prison personnel when other inmates had attempted to escape, and he later asked courts to 
consider his post-sentence actions. See, e.g., Meghan Shapiro, An Overdose of Dangerousness: 
How “Future Dangerousness” Catches the Least Culpable Capital Defendants and Undermines 
the Rationale for the Executions It Supports, 35 AM. J. CRIM. L. 145, 180–81 (2008).
316. Adam M. Gershowitz, Rethinking the Timing of Capital Clemency, 113 MICH. L. REV.
1, 18–19 (2014).
317. See Stephen P. Garvey, Aggravation and Mitigation in Capital Cases: What Do Jurors
Think?, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1538, 1539 (1998).
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mitigating weight to the fact that a codefendant received a life 
sentence.318
So, one may argue that admitting evidence of a co-participant’s 
sentence may make little difference. Or if it does make a difference, it 
will be arbitrary when it does make a difference. 
These arguments, however, may apply to the use of any mitigating 
factor or the introduction of almost any piece of evidence at trial. Jurors 
will weigh evidence based on their own understandings, intelligence, and 
experience. That fact is not a reason to exclude evidence or to interpret 
the Constitution one way or the other. And, the study still found that a 
significant portion of jurors do give as much weight to evidence of a 
codefendant’s sentence as they do for other mitigating factors currently 
allowed.319 Thus, the empirical evidence further supports that a factfinder 
could reasonably deem evidence of a codefendant’s sentence to have 
mitigating value.
Concluding that the Constitution requires trial judges to permit the use 
of a co-participant’s sentence as a mitigating circumstance is not the same 
as requiring a jury to reduce a defendant’s sentence. In our current jury 
system, we must trust jurors to weigh the value of a co-participant’s 
sentence after hearing arguments by both the defense attorney and the 
prosecutor. It is the same faith that allows jurors to weigh other mitigating 
factors like the relevance of a defendant’s abuse as a child, or a capital 
defendant’s depression, or that the defendant suffered from borderline 
personality disorder.320 In more egregious cases, such evidence about a 
co-participant likely will make little difference. And, if there is clearly a 
difference in the culpability between a defendant and a codefendant, a 
jury may downplay the different sentences. But in cases where the 
culpability of the defendant and codefendant are very similar or where 
the codefendant is more culpable, the jury should be allowed to weigh 
whether, along with other mitigating and aggravating factors, the 
evidence should affect the defendant’s sentence.
                                                                                                                     
318. Id. at 1562–65. 
319. Id. As in the case of the mitigating factor of a codefendant’s life sentence, only one-
fifth of jurors said they would give weight to the mitigating factors of lack of a criminal record 
and that the crime was committed under the influence of alcohol or drugs. Id.
320. As noted earlier, the Court has sanctioned a broad range of mitigating factors. See, e.g.,
Bobby v. Van Hook, 558 U.S. 4, 10–11 (2009) (allowing evidence of borderline personality 
disorder); Brewer v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 286, 289–90 (2007) (allowing evidence of depression); 
Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 525 (2003) (allowing evidence that the defendant lived in many 
foster homes and was sexually abused as a child); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982) 
(allowing evidence of youth and abusive family history).
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CONCLUSION
While the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on mitigating factors 
focuses on the concept of individualized sentencing and not 
proportionality, the concept of proportionality has been important to the 
Court since the beginning of the modern death penalty era. And if the 
Court does not mandate—and some states decline to adopt—
proportionality review, juries may help make the death penalty fairer if 
they consider evidence regarding a co-participant’s sentence. 
More importantly, in a capital case, the Constitution requires that 
juries be permitted to consider evidence of a codefendant’s sentence. 
Although “[c]ourts determine whether evidence is constitutionally 
relevant, . . . that evidence is relied upon by the jury to make a reasoned 
moral judgment.”321 The Court has consistently found that the 
constitutional command and the definition of “mitigating circumstances” 
is broad. Evidence regarding a codefendant’s sentence does tell the jury 
important information about the crime at issue and about the defendant’s 
role, as it reflects the relative culpability of the codefendant and the 
defendant. Additionally, such evidence tells a jury how others have 
weighed some of that information. Such evidence provides a jury with 
evidence that a factfinder could reasonably deem to have mitigating 
value.
Although several jurisdictions do not require courts to consider such 
evidence, the Supreme Court should clarify that the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments do require courts to permit juries to weigh 
evidence of a codefendant’s prison sentence when a capital defendant 
submits such evidence as a mitigating factor. Beyond the constitutionality 
of the factor, a number of courts have already illustrated that not only is
the use of such evidence helpful, but it is possible for jurors to evaluate 
such evidence without causing confusion or overburdening the legal 
system. 
Since the modern death penalty era began in the 1970s, the Court has 
continued to struggle to create a fairer and less arbitrary death penalty 
system out of the requirements of the Constitution. Arbitrariness 
remains.322 And while the law may never achieve perfect fairness in the 
way the death penalty is distributed, it should allow jurors to use every 
piece of relevant information that helps them use their moral judgment to 
move the system nearer toward that goal.323
                                                                                                                     
321. United States v. Gabrion, 719 F.3d 511, 541 (6th Cir. 2013) (Moore, J., dissenting).
322. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 302 (1987) (explaining that where 
discretion is afforded, it must minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action).
323. See, e.g., Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 170 (1994) (holding that due 
process requires jurors have access to information about what constitutes a life sentence).
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